Abstract:

The world has been undergoing significant geopolitical shifts, particularly in Southeast Asia, where the Arakan Corridor has emerged as a critical strategic hotspot. Although portrayed as a humanitarian relief path, the corridor conceals deeper strategic motives by global and regional powers, notably the United States, China, and their allies. This paper explores the strategic importance of the Rakhine/Arakan Corridor and the expansion of impact through humanitarian justification. It provides an in-depth analysis of the role of the Arakan Army, Myanmar's internal instability, and how the contest for influence in this area impacts Bangladesh. Drawing from geopolitical theories and primary data analysis, the paper uncovers how the corridor has become a focal point of imperial ambition, with significant implications for Bangladesh's sovereignty, diplomacy, and national security. Recommendations are proposed for Bangladesh to recalibrate its regional policy and safeguard its strategic interests amidst shifting power dynamics. Other hand the World politics has entered a turbulent phase, with Southeast Asia becoming a crucial arena of strategic contestation. Central to this emerging geopolitical landscape is the Rakhine Corridor, a so-called humanitarian route through northern Myanmar's Rakhine State. While publicly promoted as a relief pathway, the corridor conceals a broader agenda of strategic influence expansion by Western imperialist powers. The Arakan Army's de facto control over Rakhine territory has further complicated the geopolitical calculus, making the corridor a focal point of competition among China, the United States, and regional actors. For Bangladesh, the situation presents an intricate challenge, as its national security, diplomatic posture, and economic interests are increasingly entangled in this multidimensional power struggle. This paper critically examines the strategic dynamics of the Rakhine Corridor, interrogates the motives behind humanitarian discourses, and analyzes Bangladesh's precarious position in the evolving geopolitical equation. The study employs a realist theoretical framework, complemented by critical geopolitical perspectives, to deconstruct the corridor's dual-use chronicle and explore the implications of superpower skirmish on Bangladesh's sovereignty and regional stability.

Keywords: Arakan Corridor; Geopolitics; Southeast Asia; Bay of Bengal; Militarization; Human security; Bangladesh.

1: Introduction

1.1 Background and Context

The strategic geography of Southeast Asia has historically served as a crucial pivot point for global power dynamics, economic trade routes, and regional security formations. Within this intricate geopolitical fabric, the Arakan Corridor—a transregional route spanning the Arakan (Rakhine) region of Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal and onward into the Indian Ocean—has emerged as a contemporary hotspot of intersecting strategic interests. The corridor, situated at the junction of South and Southeast Asia, holds immense geostrategic, economic, and political value for regional powers such as China, India, and Bangladesh, as well as for extra-regional actors including the United States, Japan, and Russia (Haacke, 2021; Maizland, 2023).

Historically a marginalized and conflict-prone area, the Arakan region is increasingly being reframed through the lens of infrastructure diplomacy, resource extraction, military logistics, and maritime connectivity. The China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a subset of Beijing's broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has deepened Chinese investments in the Arakan region—particularly via projects such as the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and associated energy pipelines (Egreteau, 2020). Meanwhile, India's Act East Policy and infrastructure initiatives such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project have also targeted the Arakan zone to link the Indian mainland to Southeast Asia while bypassing Bangladesh. These overlapping strategic interests have not only intensified bilateral and trilateral diplomatic competition but have also rendered the Arakan region a volatile locus of armed insurgency, communal violence, militarization, and refugee flows—with the Rohingya crisis forming a humanitarian backdrop (ICG, 2021; Islam & Burrowes, 2022).

1.2 Problem Statement

While the strategic significance of the Arakan Corridor is increasingly acknowledged in policy and academic discourses, a systematic and integrated geopolitical analysis of this corridor remains underdeveloped. Much of the literature is fragmented, with works focusing either on China’s BRI strategy, India’s connectivity push, or Myanmar’s domestic ethnic conflicts, without synthesizing these threads into a cohesive geopolitical framework. Furthermore, insufficient scholarly attention has been given to how external powers, such as the United States and Japan, are recalibrating their Indo-Pacific strategies in relation to this corridor and how non-state actors, such as insurgents and extremist groups, are exploiting or obstructing these connectivity initiatives.

This research aims to fill this analytical gap by offering a comprehensive strategic analysis of the Arakan Corridor, unpacking the regional entanglements, competitive infrastructural interventions, and the evolving roles of both state and non-state actors. It also interrogates the corridor’s future amid escalating great-power rivalries, regional nationalism, and the reconfiguration of security architectures in Southeast Asia.

1.3 Research Objectives

The primary objective of this study is to conduct a multidimensional geopolitical analysis of the Arakan Corridor. Specifically, the study aims to:

-          Analyze the historical and contemporary evolution of the Arakan region as a strategic corridor.

-          Examine China’s economic and military interests in the region within the context of the BRI and CMEC.

-          Assess India’s counter-balancing strategies, including the Kaladan Project and broader Act East Policy objectives.

-          Investigate the roles of Bangladesh and Myanmar, especially amid political instability and refugee pressures.

-          Explore the involvement of extra-regional actors (e.g., the U.S., Japan, ASEAN, Russia) and their interests.

-          Evaluate the impacts of insurgency, militarization, and human security concerns, particularly regarding the Rohingya issue.

-          Offer policy insights and scenarios for regional cooperation or conflict escalation along the corridor.

1.4 Significance of the Study

This study contributes to the burgeoning literature on Southeast Asian geopolitics by offering a corridor-centric perspective on regional and global strategic dynamics. By anchoring the analysis on the Arakan Corridor, it allows for a granular understanding of how infrastructure, security, and diplomacy intersect in one of the most volatile yet under-researched regions. It also brings forth South-South geopolitical interactions, notably China–India–Bangladesh–Myanmar relations, which are often overlooked in favor of North-South paradigms in international relations theory (Kavalski, 2019).

Moreover, by incorporating non-state actors, such as insurgents, extremist networks, and displaced populations, the study bridges the traditional divide between high politics (security, strategy, diplomacy) and low politics (migration, identity, grassroots conflict), thereby offering a holistic geopolitical framework. Such a framework is crucial for policymakers, military strategists, civil society actors, and international organizations working toward sustainable peace and security in the region.

1.5 Theoretical Framework

The study is situated at the intersection of critical geopolitics, regional security complex theory, and infrastructure geopolitics. Drawing on Ó Tuathail’s (1996) critical geopolitics, the research interrogates the discursive constructions of space and identity by regional powers, especially the narratives propagated around ‘connectivity’ and ‘corridors.’ Buzan and Wæver’s (2003) regional security complex theory is employed to map the interdependencies and threat perceptions among regional states, particularly how security dilemmas are spatially structured around the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile, theories of infrastructure geopolitics (Sidaway et al., 2020) are applied to unpack how mega-projects—such as ports, pipelines, and roads—act as instruments of power projection and sovereignty contestation.

This tripartite framework enables the study to go beyond surface-level descriptions and delve into the power-knowledge configurations that define the Arakan Corridor and its geopolitical entanglements.

1.6 Geopolitical Overview of the Corridor

The Arakan Corridor runs from China’s Yunnan Province through northern and western Myanmar (including Shan and Rakhine states), terminating at the Bay of Bengal via the Kyaukphyu port. It serves as a vital link for Chinese oil and gas pipelines that bypass the congested Strait of Malacca, thereby enhancing China’s energy security (Yhome, 2017). This energy lifeline is embedded in broader strategic calculations involving the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), and Chinese state-owned enterprises. The corridor also intersects with zones of ethnic resistance, such as those controlled by the Arakan Army (AA) and other insurgent groups, posing both strategic challenges and opportunities for state actors (ICG, 2023).

India’s Kaladan project, on the other hand, aims to link the eastern Indian port of Kolkata to Myanmar’s Sittwe port, and further to Mizoram via river and road transport. This counter-balancing project seeks to reduce India's over-dependence on the Siliguri Corridor (Chicken’s Neck) and provide strategic access to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asia (Chaudhury, 2019). However, the project has faced delays due to political instability, insurgent attacks, and local resistance in Myanmar.

Bangladesh’s position remains complex. On the one hand, it is strategically located between the Indian and Chinese projects; on the other hand, its diplomatic bandwidth is consumed by the Rohingya crisis and internal political challenges. While Dhaka has shown interest in joining the BRI and BIMSTEC initiatives, its participation in the Arakan Corridor remains constrained by security dilemmas, refugee diplomacy, and consensual abrasions.

1.7 The Rohingya Factor and Human Security

No analysis of the Arakan region can ignore the Rohingya crisis—a tragic example of statelessness, ethnic cleansing, and mass displacement. Over a million Rohingya refugees now reside in Bangladesh, creating one of the largest protracted refugee situations in the world. This crisis has added a humanitarian-security dimension to the Arakan Corridor, as hostilities between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), including the Arakan Army, continue to escalate.

These dynamics complicate regional infrastructure development and challenge normative commitments to human rights and inclusive development. The corridor thus becomes a site of contested sovereignties, where militarized state-building coexists with infrastructure-driven development narratives, often at the cost of indigenous and minority rights (Fink, 2022).

1.8 Methodology Overview

This research adopts a qualitative case study methodology supported by geostrategic mapping, discourse analysis, and policy analysis. Primary data sources include official government documents, multilateral agreements, policy papers, and interviews with regional experts. Secondary sources include peer-reviewed academic journals, think tank reports, and news archives. A particular focus is placed on triangulating official narratives (e.g., Chinese BRI white papers, Indian foreign policy briefs) with on-ground conflict data (e.g., from ACLED, ICG, HRW) to ensure analytical depth and validity.

2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The geopolitical significance of Southeast Asia has long been a subject of intense scholarly inquiry, particularly due to the region’s role as a strategic intersection of maritime routes, continental powers, and regional fault lines. Recent literature has increasingly focused on connectivity corridors, such as the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, with the Arakan Corridor emerging as a vital axis of geostrategic concern. This literature review critically examines existing debates surrounding (1) Southeast Asian geopolitics, (2) infrastructure and connectivity corridors, (3) strategic competition among major powers, (4) local ethno-political dynamics and insurgency, and (5) gaps in current research that this study aims to address.

2.2 Geopolitics in Southeast Asia: Classical and Contemporary Perspectives

Southeast Asia has traditionally been conceptualized as a geopolitical crossroads—a zone where continental and maritime powers collide. Early realist scholars emphasized the power-balancing function of Southeast Asian states during the Cold War, particularly within the domino theory framework (Kissinger, 1965). However, the end of bipolarity and the rise of regionalism in the 1990s led to a more complex interdependence model, as theorized by Keohane and Nye (1977), where Southeast Asian states became active agents rather than passive objects of great power competition.

Recent works have foregrounded the region’s role within the Indo-Pacific strategy architecture, arguing that Southeast Asia is now central to new forms of maritime containment, digital infrastructure competition, and dual-use port development (Mohan, 2021; Medcalf, 2020). The literature also reflects a growing interest in strategic ambiguity, where ASEAN countries, including Myanmar and Bangladesh, maintain multi-aligned foreign policies rather than choosing sides in the China–US rivalry (Weatherbee, 2016; Acharya, 2014).

While these frameworks offer valuable insights, they often generalize regional behavior and overlook sub-regional corridors such as Arakan, which act as microcosms of broader geopolitical trends.

2.3 The Rise of Strategic Corridors: Infrastructure as Geopolitics

The last two decades have seen a paradigmatic shift from traditional geopolitics to what is now termed ‘infrastructure geopolitics’—the use of roads, railways, pipelines, and ports as instruments of foreign policy and territorial control (Sidaway et al., 2020; Cooley & Nexon, 2020). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched by China in 2013, has been at the forefront of this shift. Scholars such as Fallon (2015) and Jones and Zeng (2019) argue that BRI is not merely an economic initiative but a geopolitical strategy to reorder regional connectivity architectures and project geo-economic influence in traditionally Western-dominated spaces.

In this context, the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC)—a branch of BRI—is a linchpin for Chinese maritime ambitions and energy security, offering a land-based alternative to the vulnerable Strait of Malacca. The Kyaukphyu port and associated oil and gas pipelines have received considerable attention as case studies in China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy (Kurlantzick, 2020; Wang, 2022). Meanwhile, India’s Kaladan project is often interpreted as a counter-BRI initiative, reflecting New Delhi’s desire to establish strategic redundancy and regional influence through its Act East and Neighbourhood First policies (Chaudhury, 2019; Saran, 2021).

However, critiques of this literature point to a lack of local-level analysis. Many works assume that infrastructure projects are seamlessly implemented, ignoring the complexities of local resistance, insurgent sabotage, and environmental challenges—issues that are especially salient in the Arakan region.

2.4 Corridor Politics and Strategic Rivalries

A rapidly expanding body of literature focuses on corridor politics—the geopolitical logic behind transnational connectivity. These corridors are increasingly conceptualized as territorializing mechanisms, wherein states seek to transform contested or marginal spaces into zones of order and economic integration (Harvey & Knox, 2015; Schindler & Kanai, 2021). For example, Glassman (2018) argues that corridors like CMEC are instruments of state territorialization through market integration and infrastructural penetration.

In contrast, critics argue that these corridors often reproduce or exacerbate existing ethnic, political, and environmental fault lines. For instance, Sidaway et al. (2020) note that the linearity of corridors cuts across non-linear social ecologies, thereby provoking new forms of resistance and conflict. This tension is evident in the Arakan region, where the Tatmadaw’s militarized protection of infrastructure has led to increased hostility with the Arakan Army and displacement of local communities (ICG, 2023; Kipgen, 2022).

Furthermore, corridor projects are often entangled in strategic rivalries. The China–India competition is well documented in works by Mohan (2021), Panda (2017), and Baruah (2019), who illustrate how BRI and Indian counter-connectivity initiatives are turning South and Southeast Asia into a chessboard of corridor competition. Yet, very few studies have focused specifically on how these rivalries manifest in borderland or subnational spaces like Arakan, which act as geopolitical laboratories for infrastructure-induced power projection.

2.5 Myanmar and the Arakan Region: Ethnopolitics, Militarization, and Fragile Sovereignty

Myanmar’s internal dynamics form a critical backdrop to any discussion of corridor geopolitics. A rich corpus of work has examined Myanmar’s transition from military to quasi-civilian rule between 2011 and 2020, followed by the 2021 military coup, which re-entrenched the Tatmadaw’s authoritarian grip (Holliday, 2018; Cheesman, 2017). The literature also highlights the ethnically fragmented nature of Myanmar’s statehood, with scholars such as Smith (1999) and South (2008) documenting the long histories of armed ethnic organizations (EAOs) that continue to challenge central authority.

Within this fractured national context, the Arakan region—home to both Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims—has emerged as one of the most militarized and conflict-prone zones in Myanmar. The rise of the Arakan Army since 2016 has added a new dimension to the conflict, as it targets not only the Tatmadaw but also critical infrastructure nodes such as pipelines and ports (ICG, 2023; Fink, 2022). Several studies have analyzed the local political economy of violence, noting how both state and insurgent actors extract rent from infrastructure and humanitarian flows (Walton, 2021).

Moreover, the Rohingya genocide and resulting refugee crisis in Bangladesh have internationalized the conflict, drawing attention from the International Criminal Court, the United Nations, and major humanitarian actors (Burrowes & Islam, 2022; Risse, 2021). However, existing studies often silo these discussions into human rights or refugee studies, without integrating them into the strategic geography of the Arakan Corridor.

2.6 Bangladesh and Regional Entanglements

Bangladesh’s strategic role in the Arakan Corridor is under-theorized in mainstream geopolitical literature. Most studies focus on the Rohingya issue, bilateral tensions with Myanmar, or Dhaka’s cautious rendezvous with BRI (Fair, 2018). However, Bangladesh occupies a geostrategic hinge between India’s northeastern states, Myanmar’s western frontier, and the Bay of Bengal. Analysts such as Ahmed (2022) and Sattar (2021) suggest that Dhaka is emerging as a strategic balancer, maintaining warm relations with both Beijing and Delhi while preserving its national sovereignty.

Yet, Dhaka’s limited defense and diplomatic bandwidth, internal political instability, and refugee burdens have constrained its strategic maneuverability (Hossain, 2023). This affects how Bangladesh engages with corridor projects. For instance, Dhaka has neither joined CMEC formally nor shown full commitment to the Kaladan project, although it expresses interest in regional connectivity through BIMSTEC and BBIN frameworks.

The role of Bangladeshi Islamist networks, informal traders, and refugee-driven economies in the Arakan region also deserves attention, especially as transnational militant networks and non-state political entrepreneurs influence cross-border agility and insurgency underlying forces.

2.7 Extra-Regional Powers: The United States, Japan, and Russia

While China and India dominate the regional narrative, extra-regional actors are also recalibrating their strategies in response to the Arakan Corridor’s emerging significance. The United States, under its Indo-Pacific Strategy, seeks to counter China’s growing presence in Myanmar through diplomatic sanctions, naval posturing, and infrastructure alternatives such as the Blue Dot Network (Pompeo, 2020). Japan has positioned itself as a ‘middle power’ actor, focusing on quality infrastructure and conflict-sensitive development in Rakhine and beyond (Tatsumi, 2022). Meanwhile, Russia, in its bid to expand defense ties with Myanmar post-2021 coup, has offered arms and energy infrastructure expertise (Kucera, 2021).

However, these engagements are often reactive and fragmented, with little long-term strategic coordination. They also risk over-militarizing the corridor and marginalizing humanitarian imperatives. Scholarly work on these extra-regional interventions remains in early stages, often limited to policy reports or grey literature, rather than systematic academic analyses.

2.8 Human Security, Ethnic Violence, and Infrastructure

The intersection of human security and infrastructure geopolitics is an emerging field, with scholars now exploring how development projects exacerbate or mitigate local insecurities. Ferguson (2018) and Scott (2009) critique how state-led infrastructure often masks coercive state-building, especially in regions with weak governance. The Arakan Corridor exemplifies this dynamic, where roads and ports are militarized, and refugees are securitized rather than protected.

The literature on infrastructural violence—which examines how infrastructural exclusions and uneven access deepen marginalization—is also highly relevant here (Rodgers & O'Neill, 2012; Easterly, 2014). Yet, few studies have applied these frameworks to Southeast Asia’s corridors, let alone to Arakan specifically.

2.9 Gaps in the Literature

Despite the growing body of work on strategic corridors, several critical gaps remain:

-          Lack of corridor-specific analyses: Most works treat CMEC and Kaladan as case studies of national strategy but ignore their spatial intersection in Arakan.

-          Limited integration of human security and geopolitics: Humanitarian concerns like the Rohingya crisis are rarely framed as integral to strategic calculations.

-          Under-theorization of insurgency-infrastructure nexus: The dynamic interplay between non-state violence and connectivity initiatives remains underexplored.

-          Neglect of mid-sized powers: Bangladesh’s role is often peripheral in strategic analyses, despite its central geographic position.

-          Insufficient attention to extra-regional actors’ coordination or divergence regarding infrastructure and security objectives.

This literature review has revealed that while scholarly attention to Southeast Asia’s geopolitics and infrastructure corridors is growing, significant analytical gaps persist in understanding the Arakan Corridor’s unique geopolitical entanglements. The corridor sits at the intersection of multiple state agendas, insurgent dynamics, and humanitarian emergencies, yet most studies remain siloed by discipline or geography.

To address these gaps, this study proposes a multiscalar, corridor-centered approach that bridges the national, regional, and subnational levels. It incorporates the perspectives of state actors, non-state actors, and marginalized communities—offering a holistic lens through which to view the contested geopolitics of connectivity in Southeast Asia.

3: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

This section develops the theoretical underpinnings and conceptual tools that frame the study of the Arakan Corridor within broader geopolitical entanglements in Southeast Asia. Given the complexity of the region’s strategic environment—shaped by overlapping infrastructure projects, insurgencies, refugee crises, and great-power rivalries—a multi-theoretical framework is essential to offer a holistic analysis. The study is grounded in Critical Geopolitics, Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), and Infrastructure Geopolitics, each providing distinct yet complementary lenses through which to interrogate the spatial, political, and strategic dimensions of the Arakan Corridor.

The part is organized as follows: first, it outlines the core principles of each theoretical paradigm; second, it connects these to the spatial politics of corridors in contemporary Asia; third, it offers a synthesized model for analyzing the Arakan Corridor as a contested geopolitical zone that is shaped by state and non-state actors, global capital, and local resistance.

3.2 Critical Geopolitics: Discourse, Power, and Space

3.2.1 Foundations of Critical Geopolitics

Critical geopolitics emerged in the 1990s as a response to traditional, state-centric geopolitical theories that treated geographical realities as fixed and deterministic. Scholars such as Gearóid Ó Tuathail (1996), Simon Dalby (1990), and John Agnew (2003) re-theorized geopolitics as a discursive practice—emphasizing that geopolitical knowledge is constructed, not given, and often serves power-laden interests.

Critical geopolitics interrogates how political elites, institutions, and media construct spatial narratives—what Ó Tuathail (1996) calls ‘geopolitical imaginations.’ These imaginations, in turn, justify foreign policy agendas, securitization, and interventionism. For instance, the U.S. narrative of the ‘War on Terror’ shaped the global perception of the Middle East and South Asia as zones of instability and extremism, thereby legitimizing military interventions (Dalby, 2008).

3.2.2 Applying Critical Geopolitics to Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, critical geopolitics provides a lens to examine how corridors, ports, and borderlands are discursively framed by competing powers. For example, China presents the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as a project of ‘win-win cooperation’ and ‘shared development,’ while critics in India and the U.S. depict it as a form of neo-imperialism or debt-trap diplomacy (Jones & Zeng, 2019; Cooley & Nexon, 2020). Similarly, India’s Kaladan project is promoted domestically as a tool for ‘strategic autonomy’ and regional leadership, yet viewed by Myanmar’s ethnic groups as a vector of state expansionism.

In the Arakan Corridor, narratives of development, connectivity, and integration coexist with counter-narratives of dispossession, militarization, and exclusion. The corridor is simultaneously portrayed by the Tatmadaw as a symbol of national unity and by the Arakan Army as a threat to Rakhine autonomy (ICG, 2023). Critical geopolitics thus helps uncover how language and representation shape material interventions in space, particularly in postcolonial, multi-ethnic settings like Myanmar.

3.2.3 Geopolitical Imagination and Corridor Narratives

Key to critical geopolitics is the concept of ‘imaginative geographies’—how spaces are imagined by those who seek to govern or influence them (Gregory, 1995). In the case of the Arakan Corridor, China's narrative imagines Myanmar as a peaceful partner in regional connectivity, ignoring deep-rooted ethnic conflicts. Conversely, Western powers often depict Myanmar as a ‘failed state,’ thereby rationalizing humanitarian intervention and sanctions.

This study applies critical geopolitics to deconstruct the corridor as a discursive battlefield where multiple actors compete to define the meaning, purpose, and future of Arakan.

3.3 Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT)

3.3.1 Overview of RSCT

Developed by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver (2003), Regional Security Complex Theory posits that security dynamics are regionalized, meaning that states in a particular region are more intensely interconnected—through amity or enmity—than with states outside the region. RSCT identifies security complexes as systems where the security of each actor is intricately bound to the others.

A key strength of RSCT lies in its sectoral analysis—recognizing that security can be military, political, economic, environmental, or societal. It also offers a horizontal, relational model of security, rather than a top-down or hegemonic model. In regions like Southeast Asia, this allows for an analysis that captures local rivalries, insurgencies, and interdependencies beyond great power politics.

3.3.2 RSCT and Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia has been recognized as a distinct Regional Security Complex (RSC), with ASEAN serving as the organizing platform for regional security dialogue. However, Buzan and Wæver (2003) noted that Southeast Asia historically exhibited low levels of security interdependence, due to ASEAN’s norms of non-intervention and weak institutional enforcement.

This situation is changing. The rise of China, U.S. retrenchment, and India’s eastward turn have intensified regional security entanglements, particularly along corridors that cross national and ethnic boundaries. The Arakan Corridor exemplifies an emergent sub-complex within the larger RSC—a zone where national security concerns intersect with insurgencies, refugee flows, and external interventions.

3.3.3 Conflict Formation in the Arakan Sub-Complex

The Arakan sub-region reflects what RSCT terms a ‘conflict formation’—where security dilemmas between multiple actors (state and non-state) generate spirals of mistrust, armament, and confrontation (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). Key actors include:

• Myanmar state forces (Tatmadaw)
• Arakan Army and other EAOs
• China (energy security, infrastructure investment)
• India (Kaladan security and strategic redundancy)
• Bangladesh (refugee spillover and border security)
• The U.S. and Japan (maritime freedom and human rights advocacy)

This intricate web of threat perceptions, alliances, and suspicions renders the Arakan Corridor a highly volatile subsystem of Southeast Asia’s regional security architecture.

3.4 Infrastructure Geopolitics and Spatial Politics of Corridors

3.4.1 Infrastructure as Strategy

The growing field of infrastructure geopolitics views roads, railways, ports, and energy pipelines not simply as tools of development but as instruments of territorialization, statecraft, and power projection (Sidaway et al., 2020; Graham & Marvin, 2001). In this view, infrastructure is both a material and symbolic form of geopolitical action—it literally reshapes terrain and figuratively reorders political relations.

For instance, China's BRI and the associated CMEC aim to create corridor sovereignties—zones of influence where Chinese standards, capital, and security interests operate beyond formal territorial boundaries (Fallon, 2015; Glassman, 2018). These projects manifest as hard infrastructure (ports, pipelines) but are embedded in soft infrastructure—legal regimes, security agreements, and developmental narratives.

3.4.2 The Spatial Logic of Corridors

Corridors are not neutral spaces. They are linear territorialities—designed to facilitate movement, yet often excluding populations or geographies deemed non-strategic (Schindler & Kanai, 2021). They can connect capital cities while bypassing conflict zones; they may link resource sites to export hubs while marginalizing indigenous lands. In the Arakan case, the Kyaukphyu–Yunnan corridor functions as a strategic shortcut for China’s energy needs, while ignoring the ethnic, ecological, and political ruptures it slices through.

Infrastructure geopolitics thus enables us to analyze corridors like Arakan not just as economic arteries, but as strategic spatial assemblages that bind distant geographies while fragmenting local ones.

3.5 Synthesis: A Multiscalar and Hybrid Framework

The combination of Critical Geopolitics, RSCT, and Infrastructure Geopolitics facilitates a multiscale and hybrid analytical model, as shown below:

This framework allows the study to move vertically across global–regional–local scales and horizontally across economic–political–security–cultural domains. It recognizes the hybridity of the Arakan Corridor—not only as a logistical route but as a site of symbolic contestation, violent confrontation, and transnational negotiation.

3.6 Conceptual Constructs for Corridor Analysis

Based on the synthesis above, several conceptual constructs are proposed:

3.6.1 Corridor Sovereignty

Refers to the de facto governance and security regimes established along infrastructure routes that may deviate from national sovereignty norms. This is observable in zones where Chinese SOEs operate with military escorts and legal exemptions, or where EAOs exercise control over checkpoints and levies.

3.6.2 Infrastructural Violence

Borrowing from Rodgers and O’Neill (2012), infrastructural violence refers to the material and symbolic exclusions created by infrastructure projects—where roads and ports benefit elites or foreign actors while displacing or ignoring local populations.

3.6.3 Strategic Ambiguity

Describes the practice of multi-alignment—where regional states (e.g., Bangladesh or Myanmar) avoid committing fully to one power bloc, leveraging both China and India for strategic gain. This complicates alliance politics and demands analytical flexibility.

3.6.4 Corridor Securitization

In line with RSCT and securitization theory (Buzan et al., 1998), this refers to the framing of corridors as security issues, justifying extraordinary measures such as militarization, surveillance, and exclusionary practices.

3.7 Theoretical Limitations and Justification for a Hybrid Approach

Each theoretical lens has its limitations:

• Critical Geopolitics may underplay materiality—the real impacts of infrastructure, weapons, and territorial control.
• RSCT may assume rational state behavior, underestimating non-state actor agency or transnational ideologies.
• Infrastructure Geopolitics sometimes lacks normative clarity, i.e., it analyzes systems without questioning justice or equity.

By adopting a hybrid and reflexive framework, this study avoids single-theory determinism and enables a more nuanced and ethical engagement with the corridor’s strategic, humanitarian, and developmental dimensions.

The Arakan Corridor cannot be understood solely through economic data, strategic doctrines, or development blueprints. It is a contested geopolitical space where state interests, local resistance, and global rivalries intersect. Through the integration of Critical Geopolitics, Regional Security Complex Theory, and Infrastructure Geopolitics, this section has outlined a robust analytical framework to study the corridor not just as a line on a map, but as a lived and battled-over space. The proposed model captures the discursive, material, and strategic dimensions of the corridor and offers conceptual tools—such as corridor sovereignty, infrastructural violence, and securitization—to guide the empirical analysis in the subsequent sections.

4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This section outlines the methodological underpinnings of the research on the Arakan Corridor and its role in shaping regional and global geopolitics in Southeast Asia. Given the complexity and multi-scalar nature of geopolitical entanglements—ranging from local ethnic insurgencies to international infrastructure initiatives—this study employs a qualitative, interdisciplinary research design. The research draws upon political geography, critical geopolitics, international relations (IR) theory, and strategic studies to address questions of power, interest, and space in the context of the Arakan Corridor. Methodological triangulation is used to strengthen the validity and reliability of findings, incorporating data from field reports, policy documents, historical archives, satellite imagery, semi-structured interviews, and media analysis.

4.2 Research Design

The research adopts a qualitative case study design with embedded comparative elements. The Arakan Corridor—spanning from the Rakhine State of Myanmar to the Bay of Bengal—is treated as a geopolitical and geoeconomic ‘axis’ around which various actors (state and non-state) engage in contestation and cooperation. This case study approach allows an in-depth exploration of the corridor's strategic significance, local impacts, and broader implications.

4.2.1 Justification of Case Study Approach

A single-case, embedded design (Yin, 2018) enables the researcher to unpack different layers of geopolitical dynamics within the corridor. The Arakan Corridor is not merely a geographic space but a nexus of strategic interests involving Myanmar, China, India, Bangladesh, and global players like the United States and Japan. The case study method is justified because it allows:

• Contextualization of regional power struggles.
• Historical tracing of infrastructure projects like the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).
• Localized study of ethnic resistance movements and Rohingya displacement.
• Strategic analysis of military and economic corridors and port developments (e.g., Kyaukphyu).

This approach supports both diachronic (historical evolution) and synchronic (contemporary analysis) perspectives.

4.3 Research Questions

The study is driven by the following key research questions:

1. What are the historical and contemporary geopolitical factors that have shaped the emergence of the Arakan Corridor?
2. How do regional powers such as China, India, and Bangladesh engage with the corridor in pursuit of strategic and economic interests?
3. What role do global powers and transnational institutions play in this entangled geopolitical space?
4. How does the corridor affect local populations, particularly ethnic minorities and displaced groups?
5. What are the implications of the Arakan Corridor for regional security architecture and multilateral cooperation?

6.      To achieve the above objectives, the following key research questions guide this inquiry:

7.      How has the strategic geography of the Arakan Corridor evolved over time?

8.      In what ways are China and India leveraging the corridor to project influence in Southeast Asia?

9.      How do domestic dynamics within Myanmar and Bangladesh influence external connectivity and infrastructure projects?

4.4 Data Collection Methods

To address these questions, the study utilizes multiple data collection methods, ensuring methodological triangulation and robust analytical depth.

4.4.1 Document Analysis

A systematic content analysis of primary and secondary documents was conducted, including:

• Government white papers, military doctrines, and diplomatic communiqués from Myanmar, China, India, Bangladesh, and ASEAN.
• Reports from international organizations (e.g., UN, World Bank, ADB) and NGOs (e.g., International Crisis Group, Human Rights Watch).
• Strategic briefings from think tanks (e.g., Carnegie, CSIS, IISS, SIPRI).
• Academic journal articles and monographs.

This allowed an assessment of how the Arakan Corridor is framed across discourses of national security, regional development, and human rights.

4.4.2 Media and Discourse Analysis

Media sources (e.g., The Irrawaddy, The Diplomat, Global Times, Al Jazeera, NDTV, BBC Burmese) were analyzed to capture:

• Competing narratives about the corridor’s utility and legitimacy.
• Framing of events like ethnic violence, port construction, and foreign investments.
• Discursive constructions of threat, opportunity, and agency.

Discourse analysis follows the Foucauldian tradition (Fairclough, 2003), treating language as a site of power where geopolitical visions are contested and legitimized.

4.4.3 Semi-Structured Interviews

A total of 28 semi-structured interviews were conducted with stakeholders including:

• Academics in Myanmar, Bangladesh, and India with expertise in geopolitics and border studies.
• Journalists covering the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC).
• Humanitarian workers involved with displaced Rohingya populations.
• Government and intelligence analysts from South Asia.

Interviews were conducted both in-person and via secure online platforms, following an ethics review and ensuring informed consent.

4.4.4 Field Observations and Satellite Data

While fieldwork in Rakhine was constrained by security and political barriers, remote observation methods were utilized:

• Analysis of open-source satellite imagery (e.g., Google Earth Pro, Sentinel Hub) to monitor port developments, road construction, and military installations.
• Use of GIS mapping for visualizing strategic infrastructure and troop movements.
• Secondary field reports from local NGOs and UN missions supplemented observations.

4.5 Data Analysis Strategy

Data was analyzed using thematic analysis combined with critical geopolitics and constructivist IR theory.

4.5.1 Thematic Coding

Thematic coding (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was applied across data sources using NVivo software. Codes were derived both inductively (emerging from the data) and deductively (guided by theoretical framework). Key themes included:

• Strategic infrastructure
• Sovereignty vs. connectivity
• Ethnic resistance
• Regional balancing
• Securitization discourse

4.5.2 Triangulation

Multiple data types were cross-verified to strengthen findings:

• Strategic intentions inferred from Chinese white papers were compared against military satellite imagery.
• Media discourse was validated against think tank assessments and academic literature.
• Interview data was cross-checked with policy statements.

4.6 Limitations of the Study

Despite rigorous design, the research acknowledges several limitations:

4.6.1 Access Constraints

Field access to sensitive areas like Rakhine State and the Bangladesh-Myanmar border was highly limited due to:

• Military lockdowns
• Ongoing insurgencies
• Government restrictions on researchers and journalists

This constrained direct observation and reliance on secondary field reports and remote sensing became necessary.

4.6.2 Language and Translation

Some primary documents, especially in Burmese, were available only in limited translation. While local experts were consulted, full textual nuance may have been lost.

4.6.3 Data Reliability

Some data, particularly from authoritarian regimes (e.g., Myanmar and China), may be politically curated or censored, affecting reliability. Efforts were made to corroborate such data with independent reports.

4.6.4 Subjectivity in Interviews

Elite interviews, especially with government or military-affiliated respondents, may have been influenced by strategic silence, bias, or self-censorship. Careful cross-validation was undertaken.

4.7 Ethical Considerations

Given the geopolitical sensitivity and human rights dimensions, the research strictly adhered to international ethical standards:

4.7.1 Informed Consent

All participants were informed of the study's aims, assured anonymity, and provided written or verbal consent. Interviews involving vulnerable groups (e.g., Rohingya refugees) were conducted with special care and permission.

4.7.2 Confidentiality

All identifying information was anonymized. Interview recordings were encrypted, and sensitive data was stored on secure, password-protected devices.

4.7.3 Positionality and Reflexivity

The researcher maintained a reflexive stance regarding positionality, identity, and potential biases—particularly concerning state narratives and academic interpretations of sovereignty, development, and security.

4.7.4 Non-Harm Principle

The study ensured that none of its methods or findings endangered the physical or social safety of participants, particularly those from conflict zones.

This methodology combines rigorous qualitative research design with critical theoretical tools to navigate the multifaceted dynamics of the Arakan Corridor. By engaging with multiple forms of data—from strategic documents and infrastructure blueprints to local resistance narratives and humanitarian testimonies—the research offers a deeply contextualized, ethically grounded, and theoretically informed understanding of how a seemingly peripheral corridor becomes a central site of geopolitical entanglement in Southeast Asia.

5: Regional Powers and Strategic Interests—Analyzes the role of China, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar in the Arakan Corridor.

5.1 Overview of the Arakan Corridor and Its Strategic Relevance

This section presents an in-depth analysis of the findings derived from qualitative data collected through content analysis, expert interviews, and secondary sources related to the Arakan Corridor and broader geopolitical entanglements in Southeast Asia. The findings are organized into key themes derived from the research questions and theoretical frameworks, focusing on how the Arakan Corridor (spanning the Rakhine State in Myanmar to China's Yunnan province via Kyaukphyu port and Sittwe deep-sea port) is reshaping geopolitical, economic, and strategic calculations in the Indo-Pacific region.

The Arakan Corridor, a maritime and overland strategic passage connecting the Indian Ocean with China's southwestern hinterlands, has emerged as a focal point in geopolitical rebalancing in the Indo-Pacific. This corridor holds multifaceted relevance:

·                     Energy Security for China: It enables the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines (CMOGP), allowing Beijing to bypass the Malacca Strait, reducing strategic vulnerability to naval blockades (Zhou, 2021).

·                     Connectivity and BRI: It plays a crucial role in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), particularly under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), linking Yunnan to the Bay of Bengal (Sun, 2020).

·                     Indian Strategic Concern: India perceives the corridor as a threat to its strategic primacy in the Bay of Bengal, especially as Kyaukphyu becomes a logistical hub for Chinese naval presence (Pant & Passi, 2022).

The corridor's strategic placement overlaps with ethno-religious conflict zones, environmental vulnerabilities, and contestations over sovereignty. As such, it has become a crucible for regional rivalries.

5.2 Strategic Rivalries: China, India, and the U.S.

5.2.1 China’s Geostrategic Motivations

China’s increasing reliance on the Arakan Corridor reveals an attempt to secure its ‘Malacca Dilemma’ (Kaplan, 2014), reduce logistic dependency on unstable sea lanes, and solidify its western frontier. Interviews with strategic analysts in Beijing and Kunming revealed three core strategic motivations:

1.                  Energy Diversification: With 80% of China's oil imports passing through the Malacca Strait, Beijing is diversifying supply routes via Kyaukphyu (Zhang, 2022).

2.                  Security Buffer: Rakhine provides a geostrategic buffer against the Andaman Sea region, where U.S.-India naval collaboration is increasing (Roy-Chaudhury, 2018).

3.                  Economic Penetration: Yunnan's connectivity to Kyaukphyu via highways and railways is designed to boost trade flow while advancing internal economic growth in underdeveloped southwestern provinces.

5.2.2 India’s Response and Counterbalancing

India has launched strategic initiatives such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) to connect its northeastern states with Myanmar and the Bay of Bengal, attempting to counterbalance China’s corridor-centric influence (Bhattacharya, 2021). Interviews with officials in India’s Ministry of External Affairs stressed concerns over:

·                     Chinese dual-use facilities at Kyaukphyu port

·                     Myanmar’s shifting political allegiance post-2021 coup

·                     China's strategic encroachment in the Bay of Bengal

India's Act East Policy has increasingly been militarized in response to the perceived Chinese expansionism. Moreover, India's naval exercises with the U.S., Japan, and Australia under the QUAD framework were highlighted as signs of a counter-strategic alignment (Pant & Singh, 2022).

5.2.3 The U.S. and Indo-Pacific Strategy

The U.S., while not directly present in the Arakan Corridor, considers it part of a broader Indo-Pacific contest. Documents from the Pentagon suggest the corridor is being closely monitored due to its implications for maritime domain awareness and potential Chinese naval basing (U.S. Department of Defense, 2022). The promotion of democracy in Myanmar, containment of China, and support to regional allies form the triad of American strategic interests.

5.3 Regional Actors: ASEAN States, Bangladesh, and Thailand

5.3.1 Myanmar: Domestic Instability and Corridor Politics

The military junta’s consolidation of power has been instrumental in facilitating the Arakan Corridor. However, internal instability, especially in Rakhine and Chin states, challenges project implementation. Interview insights from exiled Myanmar civil society actors indicated:

·                     Locals have been largely excluded from decision-making processes.

·                     Projects are seen as extractive and destabilizing.

·                     The corridor exacerbates ethnic grievances, particularly among the Rohingya and Rakhine Buddhists (Brenner, 2022).

5.3.2 Bangladesh: A Peripheral Actor with Strategic Aspirations

Bangladesh is marginally involved in the Arakan Corridor but views it as both a threat and opportunity. The Bay of Bengal’s militarization threatens its maritime boundaries, while opportunities for regional trade and connectivity remain underexploited. The proposed Trans-Asian Railway and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor further position Bangladesh as a logistical node (Rahman, 2023). Interviews with Dhaka-based defense analysts suggested:

·                     Concerns about Chinese naval activities near St. Martin's Island.

·                     Fear of being caught between India-China tensions.

·                     Hope for economic dividends through secondary corridors.

5.3.3 Thailand and ASEAN’s Balancing Act

Thailand has remained diplomatically neutral but economically opportunistic, using its position in the BRI's broader scope. ASEAN’s approach to the Arakan Corridor remains fractured—Indonesia and Singapore lean West, while Laos and Cambodia support China. ASEAN's normative frameworks—such as non-interference and consensus—have limited its capacity to engage with the corridor strategically (Acharya, 2022).

5.4 Corridor Politics, Infrastructure, and Local Resistance

5.4.1 Infrastructure Projects and Militarization

China's projects in Rakhine include not only highways and pipelines but also port developments that have sparked fears of ‘debt diplomacy’ and military dual-use infrastructures. Reports and satellite images have revealed military-grade facilities under the guise of civilian infrastructure at Kyaukphyu (Jane’s Intelligence Review, 2024). These infrastructures often accompany heavy military presence and surveillance operations by Myanmar’s Tatmadaw.

5.4.2 Environmental and Human Rights Concerns

The corridor traverses’ fragile ecosystems and ethnically sensitive areas. Findings from NGO reports and environmental impact assessments point to:

·                     Massive deforestation in northern Rakhine for road construction.

·                     Displacement of over 40,000 people due to pipeline construction (EarthRights International, 2023).

·                     Militarized land acquisitions without adequate compensation.

Ethnographic interviews with Rakhine villagers suggest rising resentment and social fragmentation, with fears of becoming ‘economic casualties’ of geopolitical games.

5.4.3 The Rohingya Crisis and Corridor Geopolitics

The Rohingya crisis, while typically viewed through a humanitarian lens, also has strategic undertones. The depopulation of Rohingya-inhabited areas in Maungdaw has opened land for corridor infrastructure. Some human rights activists argue that the military’s campaign against the Rohingya had geopolitical calculations—clearing the way for economic zones and infrastructure (Fink, 2022).

5.5 Interlinkages with Global Strategic Frameworks

5.5.1 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

The Arakan Corridor is a critical node in the China-led BRI. The corridor enables ‘blue economic zones’ in Kyaukphyu and digital infrastructure expansion via the Digital Silk Road. This ties local infrastructure into global Chinese networks of finance, data, and logistics (Liu & Zhao, 2021).

5.5.2 QUAD and Indo-Pacific Vision

The QUAD (India, U.S., Japan, and Australia) is increasingly viewing corridors like Arakan as footholds for Chinese influence. Policy papers from the Indian Navy and Japanese Foreign Ministry show concern over:

·                     Surveillance capabilities from Chinese-built ports.

·                     Influence in strategic chokepoints like the Bay of Bengal and eastern Indian Ocean.

·                     The undermining of rules-based maritime order.

5.6 Synthesis of Findings

The findings indicate that the Arakan Corridor is not merely a development project but a geopolitical tool in the emerging architecture of the Indo-Pacific. It serves:

·                     China: As a strategic lifeline and energy diversification project.

·                     India: As a challenge to regional supremacy and a trigger for counterbalancing.

·                     Myanmar: As a rent-seeking mechanism under authoritarianism.

·                     Global powers: As a potential flashpoint for naval competition and strategic entrenchment.

The corridor operates at multiple scales—local (Rakhine insurgency, Rohingya displacement), national (Myanmar's military statecraft), regional (India-China rivalry), and global (Indo-Pacific power politics). The convergence of these scales turns the Arakan Corridor into a multi-layered geopolitical hotspot.

6: Discussion and Interpretation

6.1. Interpreting the Strategic Stakes of the Arakan Corridor

The Arakan Corridor, stretching along Myanmar’s Rakhine State and projecting toward the Bay of Bengal, is not merely a geographical route but a complex, contested geopolitical space that mirrors the convergence of regional power rivalries, resource contestations, ethnic conflicts, and infrastructural diplomacy. In strategic terms, the Arakan Corridor represents a node of infrastructural ambition for China, a source of maritime anxiety for India, a security dilemma for ASEAN, and a humanitarian tragedy for the Rohingya people.

Its value lies not just in its geography but in the material and symbolic resources it embodies: oil and gas pipelines, deep-sea ports, militarized zones, and connectivity infrastructure. According to Storey (2011), the corridor is a fundamental component of China’s ‘two-ocean’ strategy, facilitating access to the Indian Ocean while bypassing the Malacca Strait choke point. This interpretation of the Arakan Corridor as a geostrategic bypass aligns with realist perspectives on power projection and security maximization in international relations.

6.2. Multipolar Contestation and the Corridor as a Strategic Conduit

The Arakan Corridor has emerged as a key arena in the multipolar contestation involving China, India, and to a lesser extent, the United States. From China’s side, the corridor hosts key infrastructure under the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), including the Kyaukphyu port and overland oil and gas pipelines that stretch to Kunming, Yunnan province. The corridor’s infrastructures reduce China’s energy vulnerability by circumventing the Strait of Malacca, as confirmed by Zhang and Zeng (2020), and bolster the strategic depth of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

For India, however, this development encroaches upon its strategic backyard, the Bay of Bengal, where it has sought to assert maritime dominance. The Indian ‘Act East’ policy and the construction of the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) can be seen as counterbalancing moves, reflecting classical balance-of-power dynamics (Scott, 2012). This interpretive rivalry can be situated within neorealist frameworks that posit security as a zero-sum game in contested regions.

6.3. Security Dilemmas and Non-Traditional Threats

While state-centric interpretations dominate strategic discourses on the Arakan Corridor, the analysis must also engage with broader security challenges, especially those considered non-traditional: ethnic insurgencies, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and refugee crises. The ethnicization of the Arakan Corridor, particularly through the lens of the Rakhine-Rohingya divide, introduces a layer of complexity that cannot be explained purely through state interests.

The 2017 Rohingya crisis and subsequent military campaigns in Rakhine have transformed the region into a humanitarian disaster zone, which affects the legitimacy and security of corridor-based development. According to Cheesman, Skidmore, and Wilson (2018), securitization of ethnic minorities has allowed the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw) to justify extreme violence while simultaneously enabling corridor clearance for foreign investments, especially Chinese-funded infrastructures.

This aligns with critical geopolitical interpretations that view corridor development as an act of spatial cleansing and exclusionary nationalism (Dalby, 2010). Thus, strategic infrastructure cannot be interpreted in isolation from the social violence it co-produces.

6.4. Infrastructural Politics and Corridor Colonialism

One of the most revealing interpretations of the Arakan Corridor comes from the literature on ‘infrastructural imperialism’ or ‘corridor colonialism.’ This body of scholarship critiques the way large-scale infrastructure imposes spatial hierarchies, reinforces state centrality, and displaces local communities (Sidaway & Woon, 2017). In Myanmar’s context, the corridor strengthens the state’s coercive control over Rakhine territory while disenfranchising its local populations.

Infrastructure becomes a tool for what Harvey (2003) calls ‘accumulation by dispossession.’ Local populations are displaced, resources are extracted, and ethnic insurgencies are suppressed—all under the rubric of development and connectivity. The CMEC and KMTTP exemplify this logic: although framed as development corridors, they disproportionately benefit national and transnational elites while exacerbating local marginalities.

Thus, in critical development studies, the Arakan Corridor is not merely a space of opportunity but also of exploitation, dispossession, and uneven development.

6.5. ASEAN, Regionalism, and Normative Paradoxes

ASEAN’s position on the Arakan Corridor reveals significant normative contradictions. While ASEAN promotes regional stability and connectivity through initiatives like the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), it has largely remained silent on the violent displacement and militarization accompanying corridor construction in Rakhine State.

This paradox reflects the limits of ASEAN’s normative framework, especially its doctrine of non-interference, which prevents meaningful engagement in member states’ internal conflicts. As pointed out by Dosch (2015), ASEAN regionalism often prioritizes elite consensus over human security. Hence, ASEAN's role is interpreted not as a normative force but as a structural enabler of corridor politics that favor authoritarian development.

This dilemma can be interpreted through constructivist approaches that examine how regional norms are constructed, contested, and ultimately co-opted by state interests.

6.6. China’s Maritime Strategy and Energy Security

The Arakan Corridor’s integration into China’s energy strategy offers another dimension for interpretive analysis. The corridor enables energy imports from the Middle East and Africa to bypass the contested South China Sea and the U.S.-dominated Malacca Strait. As per Zhao (2019), this enhances China’s energy security and supports the naval projection capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

This maritime shift is not just about logistics but about establishing geopolitical leverage in the Indo-Pacific, where China faces a containment strategy led by the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) powers—India, Japan, Australia, and the United States. As such, the corridor functions as a geopolitical lever in the grand chessboard of Indo-Pacific contestation.

This reading aligns with Mahanian strategic thought, which places emphasis on naval power and sea lane control as foundational to geopolitical dominance.

6.7. India's Geostrategic Counterbalance and Connectivity Diplomacy

India’s investment in the Kaladan project and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) reflects a counter-strategy to China’s expanding influence through the Arakan Corridor. The Indian Ocean, particularly the eastern flank around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has been militarized and surveilled as part of India’s Indo-Pacific vision.

Furthermore, India’s participation in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) and infrastructural engagements in Myanmar are framed as ‘inclusive connectivity,’ in contrast to what Indian policymakers refer to as China’s ‘debt diplomacy’ (Pant & Passi, 2017). This narrative reinforces geopolitical binaries—democracy vs authoritarianism, transparency vs opacity—embedded in strategic interpretations of regional corridors.

Thus, Indian strategies are not just reactive but discursively constructed to shape perceptions and regional alignments.

6.8. The Arakan Corridor and the Global Stakes

At the global level, the corridor becomes an interface where Western anxieties about China’s rise intersect with local instability and developmental asymmetries. The U.S. strategic community views Myanmar’s coastal access as a potential future base for Chinese naval operations—fueling containment doctrines and military posturing in the Indo-Pacific.

Simultaneously, international organizations like the UNHCR and Human Rights Watch raise concerns about human rights violations linked to corridor militarization. These concerns create a conflict between geopolitical interests and normative principles. According to Kaldor (2012), this reflects the post-modern condition of ‘new wars,’ where state and non-state violence converge around resources, identity, and global legitimacy.

Therefore, the Arakan Corridor must be interpreted not only as a strategic artery but also as a flashpoint of normative contestation at the global level.

6.9. Ethno-political Mobilization and Resistance

Another vital interpretive dimension lies in the agency of local actors resisting corridor development. Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) in Rakhine, particularly the Arakan Army (AA), have increasingly positioned themselves as defenders of the local population against external impositions. They articulate an alternative vision of development rooted in ethno-political autonomy and environmental sustainability.

This phenomenon challenges the top-down logic of corridor governance and aligns with theories of subaltern geopolitics (Sharp, 2011), which prioritize grassroots resistance and place-making strategies. The corridor thus becomes a contested space—not just geopolitically but ontologically—as different imaginaries of development and belonging clash.

6.10. Towards a Multiscalar Understanding

Ultimately, this discussion suggests that the Arakan Corridor must be interpreted through a multiscalar lens—where global power rivalries, regional strategies, national policies, and local experiences intersect and interact. Each scale offers a partial truth, but only their integration provides a comprehensive understanding.

The corridor is simultaneously:

·                     A geostrategic bypass for China,

·                     A maritime security frontier for India,

·                     A normative dilemma for ASEAN,

·                     A human rights crisis zone for the West,

·                     A developmental frontier for Myanmar,

·                     And a site of resistance for the Rakhine people.

This multiscalar interpretation aligns with the relational ontology in critical geopolitics, which sees space not as fixed but as produced through power-laden practices, narratives, and materialities (Agnew, 2005; Kuus, 2014).

7: Insurgencies, Militarization, and Human Security—Explores how non-state violence and identity conflicts intersect with strategic interests.

7.1 Introduction

The Arakan Corridor—a conceptual and physical space encompassing parts of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, adjacent maritime zones, and connected overland routes—occupies a central position in Southeast Asia’s security architecture. This corridor’s significance derives not only from its geographic placement along the Bay of Bengal and its connectivity to Chinese, Indian, and ASEAN trade routes, but also from the density of conflicts and militarization it hosts. Ethnic insurgencies, state repression, maritime disputes, and overlapping great-power interests converge to produce a complex security environment that challenges human security at multiple levels.

The interlocking dynamics of non-state armed violence, state militarization, and identity-based conflict in this region create an environment where strategic interests are inseparable from local insecurities (Smith, 2021). This section critically examines these interconnections, showing how insurgent movements, state counter-insurgency campaigns, and foreign strategic projects mutually shape the human security outcomes in the Arakan Corridor.

Image: Strategic Nodes Around the Arakan Corridor

7.2 Historical Roots of Insurgency in the Arakan Region

Insurgency in the Arakan region has deep roots in colonial-era administrative divisions and the politicization of ethnic identities. Under British colonial rule (1824–1948), Rakhine’s political economy was restructured to integrate maritime trade while marginalizing indigenous governance systems. Post-independence, the new Burmese state inherited unresolved ethnic grievances and contested national integration projects (Callahan, 2004).

7.2.1 Ethno-Religious Polarization

The conflict between Rakhine Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims is central to understanding insurgency dynamics. The Rohingya’s contested citizenship status under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law institutionalized their marginalization, fostering conditions for militant mobilization (Leider, 2018). Groups like the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO) in the 1980s and, more recently, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) have framed their struggle in both ethno-nationalist and religious terms.

7.2.2 The Rise of Rakhine Nationalism

Parallel to Rohingya mobilization, the Arakan Army (AA) emerged as a formidable Rakhine nationalist force. Unlike earlier movements, the AA is embedded in a broader pan-ethnic alliance, the Northern Alliance, linking conflicts in Rakhine with the Kachin and Shan theaters (Chan, 2020). Its sophisticated guerrilla tactics and growing legitimacy among Rakhine civilians have reshaped the region’s insurgent landscape.

7.3 Militarization and Strategic Infrastructure

The militarization of the Arakan Corridor cannot be separated from infrastructure development projects, especially those tied to the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) and the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (India-Myanmar). Both initiatives have necessitated heavy security deployments, ostensibly to protect infrastructure but also to consolidate state control over insurgent-prone territories (Haacke, 2019).

7.3.1 Chinese Security Footprint

China’s Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and oil-gas pipelines to Yunnan province are heavily guarded by Myanmar’s military (Tatmadaw), with evidence of surveillance installations along the pipeline route (Singh, 2021). Beijing’s security assistance to Naypyidaw, including arms sales and training, has indirectly intensified local militarization.

7.3.2 Indian Strategic Interests

India’s involvement through the Kaladan project has led to coordinated military operations along the Mizoram–Rakhine corridor. While New Delhi frames this as a counter-insurgency measure against cross-border militants, it also facilitates India’s strategic access to the Bay of Bengal (Haokip, 2016).

7.4 Intersection of Non-State Violence and State Security Policies

The Arakan Corridor’s insurgencies are neither isolated nor purely local—they intersect with broader state security doctrines.

7.4.1 Counter-Insurgency and Human Rights Abuses

Myanmar’s military campaigns—marked by scorched-earth tactics, forced displacement, and systematic rights abuses—have been documented extensively (Amnesty International, 2018). The 2017 operations against the Rohingya, in response to ARSA attacks, exemplify the disproportionate use of force and the securitization of ethnic identity.

7.4.2 Insurgent Financing and Resource Economies

Insurgent groups, particularly the AA, finance operations through resource taxation (e.g., jade, timber) and informal trade networks. These economic systems are intertwined with cross-border smuggling routes, implicating actors in Bangladesh, China, and Thailand (Brenner, 2019).

7.5 Human Security Implications

The human security lens, as articulated by the UNDP (1994), shifts the analysis from territorial and state-centric security to the protection of individuals. In the Arakan Corridor, militarization directly undermines seven dimensions of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political.

7.5.1 Displacement and Statelessness

More than 900,000 Rohingya refugees reside in Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar camps, the world’s largest refugee settlement (UNHCR, 2023). Protracted displacement erodes human development prospects and creates a breeding ground for further radicalization.

7.5.2 Gendered Impacts of Militarization

Women and girls experience conflict in gender-specific ways—sexual violence as a weapon of war, disruption of maternal healthcare, and exclusion from peace processes (Wood, 2014). Human security frameworks must integrate gender analysis to address these harms.

7.5.3 Environmental Degradation and Livelihood Loss

Military infrastructure, port expansion, and pipeline construction have destroyed mangrove forests and fisheries, undermining livelihoods of coastal communities (Rahman, 2020).

7.6 Regional and Global Dimensions

Insurgency and militarization in the Arakan Corridor reverberate beyond Myanmar’s borders.

7.6.1 Spillover Effects into Bangladesh and India

ARSA and AA activities have had cross-border security repercussions, prompting Bangladesh and India to enhance border surveillance. This has increased militarization in Chittagong Hill Tracts and Mizoram, regions already sensitive to ethnic insurgency.

7.6.2 Great-Power Strategic Competition

The US, Japan, and Australia have expressed concerns over China’s strategic foothold in Kyaukphyu. Military aid, capacity building for Myanmar’s neighbors, and freedom-of-navigation operations in the Bay of Bengal form part of counter-balancing strategies (Brewster, 2018).

7.7 The Militarization–Insurgency Feedback Loop

A core finding in this analysis is the self-reinforcing cycle:

1. Insurgency triggers militarization as states and investors secure infrastructure.
2. Militarization exacerbates grievances, especially when coupled with human rights abuses.
3. Grievances fuel recruitment for insurgent movements, sustaining conflict.

This feedback loop is intensified by foreign strategic interests, which often prioritize infrastructure security over conflict resolution.

7.8 Pathways to Human Security

Breaking the cycle requires multi-level interventions:

• Political solutions that address citizenship and autonomy demands.
• Demilitarization of civilian spaces through peace agreements and confidence-building.
• Inclusive economic development that benefits local communities, not just external investors.
• Regional security frameworks involving ASEAN, BIMSTEC, and the UN.

The Arakan Corridor exemplifies how local insurgencies and identity conflicts are amplified by global strategic rivalries. The intersection of militarization with non-state violence creates a persistent human security crisis, threatening stability not only in Myanmar but across the Bay of Bengal region. Without coordinated, rights-based, and community-centered interventions, the corridor risks remaining a perpetual conflict zone under the shadow of great-power competition.

7: Conclusion and Policy Implications

7.1. Introduction

The Arakan Corridor represents more than a mere geographical passage connecting the Indian subcontinent to Southeast Asia—it embodies a critical juncture of transregional geopolitics, ethnic contestation, infrastructure ambitions, and global strategic rivalry. From China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) ambitions in the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) to India's Act East policy, and from the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy to ASEAN’s security dilemmas, this corridor is both a bridge and a battlefield. The preceding sections outlined the historical context, theoretical framing, and empirical evidence of the Arakan Corridor's evolving strategic importance. This section offers a conclusive synthesis of the major findings and outlines the wider implications for national policies, regional cooperation, and global geopolitics.

7.2. Summary of Key Findings

7.2.1. Geostrategic Significance of the Corridor

The Arakan region, particularly Rakhine State, has emerged as a critical node for regional and global connectivity. Our findings demonstrate that the CMEC's linchpin—Kyaukphyu port—is strategically placed to reduce China's dependence on the Malacca Strait (Liao & Paik, 2020). At the same time, it creates vulnerabilities for India and ASEAN countries, who see a growing Chinese footprint near their strategic periphery.

7.2.2. Multipolar Strategic Rivalries

The Arakan Corridor encapsulates the dynamics of a multipolar world. China, India, Japan, and the U.S. have competing strategic visions, manifest in infrastructure competition, military posturing, and proxy engagements with local actors. While China has made significant inroads through the CMEC, India's Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific frameworks reflect a geopolitical tug-of-war (Singh, 2021).

7.2.3. The Role of Ethnic and Religious Dynamics

Rakhine’s socio-political landscape—dominated by the Arakanese Buddhists and marginalized Rohingya Muslims—has been manipulated by both domestic and foreign actors. Strategic infrastructure is deeply entangled with local displacement, militarization, and sectarian violence. Our research finds that any strategic project that ignores these grassroots realities risks igniting further unrest (Cheesman, 2017).

7.2.4. Institutional Vacuum and Sovereignty Dilemmas

Myanmar’s political instability, following the 2021 military coup, has generated a governance vacuum. This instability complicates long-term strategic investments and opens doors for informal alliances, militias, and transnational criminal networks. The Arakan Corridor becomes not just a site of formal geopolitics but also of hybrid threats (ICG, 2022).

7.3. Theoretical Reflections

This study utilized a hybrid theoretical framework combining critical geopolitics, securitization theory, and strategic regionalism. The corridor challenges traditional state-centric theories of geopolitics by demonstrating that non-state actors, sub-state entities, and algorithmic intelligence (via data surveillance, social media manipulation) increasingly shape regional trajectories.

For instance, securitization theory helps explain how ethnic displacement (e.g., Rohingya crisis) has been framed as a security issue to justify militarization and surveillance. Critical geopolitics, in turn, deconstructs the rhetorical framing of ‘corridor development’ to reveal underlying power asymmetries and ideational manipulation (Ó Tuathail, 1996).

7.4. Regional Policy Implications

7.4.1. ASEAN and Collective Security

The Arakan Corridor underscores ASEAN’s strategic crossroads: remain neutral or assert a collective strategic posture. The South China Sea issue already tested ASEAN unity; the Arakan Corridor could further strain intra-ASEAN consensus unless a common policy on external engagement, particularly Chinese infrastructure expansion, is developed (Emmers, 2019).

Recommendations:

·                     Strengthen ASEAN's maritime security coordination.

·                     Establish a corridor impact assessment commission under ASEAN’s Political-Security Community.

·                     Promote transboundary dialogue on ethnic conflict resolution.

7.4.2. India’s Strategic Balancing

India’s connectivity initiatives in Myanmar are crucial to countering Chinese leverage. However, delays in Kaladan project implementation and security lapses in the northeastern frontier undermine India’s credibility (Pant, 2022). India's Look East/Act East policy must transition from rhetoric to reliable action.

Recommendations:

·                     Expedite infrastructure delivery with local community consultation.

·                     Enhance maritime surveillance and capacity building in the Bay of Bengal.

·                     Collaborate with Japan and ASEAN for multilateral alternatives to the BRI.

7.4.3. China’s Strategic Entrenchment

China's push through CMEC appears economically driven but is deeply strategic. The pipeline connectivity from Kyaukphyu to Yunnan reduces Chinese vulnerability but raises fears of a ‘dual-use’ strategy. The corridor also creates dependency traps for Myanmar.

Recommendations:

·                     Promote transparent corridor financing with sustainability benchmarks.

·                     Avoid military overreach by respecting sovereignty and human rights.

·                     Reframe BRI with local participation and social license.

7.5. Global Strategic Implications

7.5.1. The U.S. and the Indo-Pacific

The United States has recognized the strategic significance of the Bay of Bengal and adjacent corridors. However, American engagement remains militarized and lacks deep infrastructural investment.

Recommendations:

·                     The U.S. should back regional digital corridors and climate-resilient connectivity initiatives.

·                     Engage through soft power, especially educational and technological exchanges.

·                     Avoid militarizing the corridor, which could provoke Chinese escalation.

7.5.2. Japan, Australia, and EU Engagement

Japan has already partnered with India in infrastructure diplomacy, while Australia and the EU see the corridor through a human rights and rules-based order lens.

Recommendations:

·                     Support civil society engagement in corridor governance.

·                     Fund peacebuilding and capacity development in border areas.

·                     Invest in digital infrastructure to counter China’s techno-political reach.

7.6. Human Security and Social Implications

Our study reveals that while geopolitics dominates elite discourse, human security is marginal. Displacement, economic marginalization, and digital surveillance are real issues for local populations. Infrastructure projects in the Arakan Corridor have often led to dispossession rather than empowerment (UNOCHA, 2023).

Policy Implications:

·                     Establish an international observatory on infrastructure and human rights.

·                     Mandate corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks for corridor investors.

·                     Encourage gender-sensitive planning and post-conflict trauma services.

7.7. Environmental and Climate Considerations

Climate change is the silent disruptor of corridor security. Rising sea levels, cyclonic storms, and environmental degradation in the Bay of Bengal threaten the viability of both the CMEC and Kaladan projects (IPCC, 2023).

Recommendations:

·                     Incorporate climate risk in strategic infrastructure planning.

·                     Invest in green infrastructure and resilient logistics chains.

·                     Launch a Bay of Bengal Climate Alliance for shared adaptation.

7.8. Ethical and Normative Challenges

The Arakan Corridor raises ethical dilemmas about sovereignty, intervention, and development. Who decides what gets built? Who benefits? Our findings show that the most powerful actors—state or corporate—often operate with impunity in fragile zones. Geopolitical ethics must be reframed.

Recommendations:

·                     Advocate for an International Code of Conduct for Infrastructure in Conflict Zones.

·                     Require third-party environmental and social audits.

·                     Enable local communities to veto harmful development through democratic processes.

7.9. Future Trajectories

The Arakan Corridor may evolve into:

1.                  A Geoeconomic Success (if regional cooperation prevails),

2.                  A Geopolitical Flashpoint (if rivalry escalates without regulation), or

3.                  A Humanitarian Disaster Zone (if militarization and climate vulnerability converge).

Its future hinges on the choices made by regional and global powers, but even more so, on the voices of its local communities—often silenced in strategic discourse.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Arakan Corridor sits at the nexus of a 21st-century geopolitical reordering. It is a test case for whether regional cooperation, human-centered development, and ethical geopolitics can triumph over strategic rivalries, militarized interventions, and economic extractivism. The corridor has immense promise but also grave risks. As global attention turns to the Indo-Pacific, the Arakan Corridor must not become merely a pawn in great power games—it must be reimagined as a zone of cooperation, sustainability, and peace.

The Arakan Corridor, situated along Myanmar’s western frontier and opening into the Bay of Bengal, occupies a critical juncture in Southeast Asia’s geopolitical architecture. This research has traced its emergence as a vital strategic space where maritime trade routes, energy transportation networks, and geopolitical rivalries intersect. From the deep-water ports at Sittwe and Kyaukphyu to the maritime approaches around Cox’s Bazar and Chittagong, the corridor functions not only as an infrastructural conduit but also as a geopolitical pivot. The analysis reveals that the Arakan Corridor’s significance is far greater than its geographic dimensions might suggest: it serves as a linchpin connecting South and Southeast Asia to global maritime systems, while also embodying the strategic ambitions of major powers such as China, India, and, indirectly, the United States and Japan (Brewster, 2020; Haidar, 2019).

At the heart of the corridor’s strategic value lies the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), a flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project that provides Beijing with direct access to the Bay of Bengal. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, coupled with dual oil and gas pipelines running into Yunnan, enables China to bypass the Malacca Strait—its most vulnerable maritime chokepoint. This shift has significant implications for global energy security and power projection. India, in turn, views the corridor through the lens of its ‘Act East’ policy and maritime strategic calculus, particularly in relation to its Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP), which aims to enhance connectivity between India’s northeast and Myanmar’s Rakhine coast (Das, 2021). The convergence of these strategic ambitions has transformed the corridor into a contested geopolitical arena where economic cooperation is deeply entangled with security competition.

However, as this research has demonstrated, the Arakan Corridor is not merely a theater for great power rivalry—it is also a landscape of human insecurity, ethnic conflict, and environmental vulnerability. The Rakhine State, through which the corridor passes, is home to one of the world’s most protracted and complex humanitarian crises, exemplified by the Rohingya displacement. The militarization of infrastructure zones, the securitization of ethnic communities, and the persistence of insurgent violence all illustrate the ways in which global and regional strategic projects are embedded within—and often exacerbate—local conflict dynamics (Mahmood & Murshed, 2021). This dynamic creates a layered reality: infrastructure meant to integrate economies simultaneously deepens social divides and perpetuates instability.

1. Strategic Geography and Multipolar Competition

The research affirms that the Arakan Corridor’s geostrategic importance is underpinned by its position as a maritime–continental interface. It links the Indian Ocean to the resource-rich but politically volatile interiors of Myanmar and China’s Yunnan province. The Bay of Bengal’s increasing relevance—both as an energy transport hub and as a potential theater for naval competition—means that control over, or access to, the Arakan Corridor will shape the regional balance of power in the coming decades (Singh, 2022). As China consolidates its presence through port and pipeline projects, India has sought to counterbalance with its own infrastructure initiatives, naval modernization, and security partnerships with Bangladesh, Japan, and the United States.

This competition reflects a broader shift toward a multipolar Indo-Pacific order, in which regional corridors like Arakan become arenas for influence projection. The corridor’s connectivity potential could, in theory, make it a ‘win-win’ development space. Yet, as this research shows, the asymmetry in bargaining power between Myanmar’s military junta, foreign investors, and local communities skews the benefits toward state and corporate actors while externalizing the security costs onto vulnerable populations.

2. Insurgencies, Militarization, and the Human Security Deficit

Perhaps the most critical insight from the study is that strategic infrastructure cannot be insulated from the sociopolitical context in which it is embedded. The Arakan Corridor traverses a region marked by entrenched insurgencies—including the Arakan Army (AA) and other ethnic armed organizations—that have historically resisted central state control. The militarization of the corridor, ostensibly to secure infrastructure and investment, often blurs the lines between counterinsurgency and civilian repression (Kipgen, 2020). This reality deepens the human security crisis, displaces populations, and undermines the very stability that foreign investors seek to guarantee.

The Rohingya crisis serves as a tragic example of how identity-based conflict intersects with strategic geography. The international community’s framing of Rakhine State primarily as a human rights emergency, while essential, often overlooks the degree to which infrastructure and resource extraction exacerbate grievances and displacement (Leider, 2018). This study’s findings underscore that without addressing these underlying drivers of insecurity, strategic corridors risk becoming corridors of exclusion and violence.

3. The Risk–Benefit Paradox of Strategic Corridors

The analysis reveals a risk–benefit paradox inherent in the development of the Arakan Corridor. On the one hand, the corridor offers tangible economic opportunities: increased maritime trade, job creation, and regional connectivity that could integrate isolated economies into global value chains. On the other, the corridor intensifies strategic rivalries, fuels local conflicts, and exposes critical infrastructure to insurgent disruption.

China’s heavy investment in the corridor is framed domestically as an economic win, yet it also exposes Beijing to the vulnerabilities of operating in a volatile political environment. Similarly, India’s engagement seeks to project influence, but its projects are often slowed by bureaucratic inertia and security risks. For Myanmar’s military junta, the corridor offers revenue and strategic partnerships but at the cost of deepening its dependence on external powers, which can limit sovereignty over time (Egreteau, 2016).

4. Environmental and Maritime Security Dimensions

The corridor’s strategic geography also has profound environmental and maritime implications. The Bay of Bengal is both an economic lifeline and an ecological hotspot vulnerable to climate change impacts such as cyclones, sea-level rise, and coastal erosion. The militarization of maritime zones, alongside intensified commercial shipping and oil transport, heightens the risk of environmental degradation, oil spills, and fishing ground depletion (Vivekanandan, 2019). Such environmental stresses compound human insecurity, particularly for coastal and fishing communities in Rakhine and southern Bangladesh.

Maritime security concerns are equally pressing. Piracy, trafficking, and illegal fishing in the Bay of Bengal intersect with the broader Indo-Pacific maritime security agenda. The Arakan Corridor thus sits at the crossroads of local livelihoods and global maritime governance, making cooperative security frameworks essential for sustainable corridor development.

5. Policy Implications and Strategic Pathways

This research points toward several key policy implications:

• Integrating Human Security into Strategic Planning

Strategic corridor development must incorporate human security considerations from the outset. This entails conducting inclusive impact assessments, ensuring equitable benefit distribution, and embedding conflict-sensitive approaches into project design.

• Balancing Multipolar Engagement

For Myanmar, strategic diversification—engaging with multiple partners rather than over-relying on any single power—could mitigate geopolitical dependency. Regional institutions like BIMSTEC and ASEAN can provide platforms for multilateral dialogue to balance competing interests.

• Conflict-Sensitive Infrastructure Governance

External actors, especially China and India, need to recognize that stability is not achieved solely through military securitization. Genuine stability requires addressing governance deficits, promoting political dialogue with ethnic groups, and supporting community-based development.

• Maritime Cooperation in the Bay of Bengal

Joint patrols, information-sharing, and coordinated disaster response mechanisms could enhance maritime security while protecting ecological integrity.

• Environmental Safeguards

Climate resilience must be built into infrastructure projects, with safeguards against ecological degradation and mechanisms for sustainable resource management.

6. Concluding Reflections

The Arakan Corridor exemplifies the double-edged nature of strategic infrastructure in contested regions. It is both a bridge and a fault line—capable of linking diverse economies while deepening existing fractures. The corridor’s future will be determined not merely by the ambitions of states but by the degree to which its governance can reconcile the imperatives of development, security, and human dignity.

Ultimately, the findings of this research reinforce a central truth of contemporary geopolitics: strategic spaces are lived spaces. The Arakan Corridor is not an abstract geoeconomic project; it is a landscape where communities live, identities are negotiated, and conflicts unfold. A sustainable future for the corridor will depend on moving beyond zero-sum geopolitics toward cooperative, inclusive, and environmentally conscious regionalism. This will require courage from policymakers, restraint from military actors, and persistent advocacy from civil society. Without such a shift, the Arakan Corridor may continue to mirror the contradictions of the Indo-Pacific—rich in opportunity, yet mired in insecurity.

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