Abstract

The political landscape of Bangladesh underwent a seismic shift following the imposition of the so-called ‘Yunus Interim Regime’ on August 5, 2024, which many domestic and international observers have described as unconstitutional. This regime, allegedly backed by a combination of elite NGO actors, military factions, and foreign intelligence operatives—most notably from Pakistan—has disrupted democratic continuity and raised concerns over the reassertion of post-colonial authoritarian alliances in South Asia. The rise of Muhammad Yunus, under the veil of Nobel credibility and civil society branding, marks a critical juncture where technocratic populism merged with transnational intelligence apparatuses. The aim of this paper is to analyze the factors that enabled this unconstitutional seizure of power, the Pakistan nexus behind it, and the socio-political and international implications for Bangladesh. The study further evaluates the systemic erosion of institutional legitimacy, the selective repression of political opposition, and the broader regional dynamics involving India, China, and the Gulf States. Based on qualitative content analysis, public domain intelligence, diplomatic communiqués, and firsthand reporting, this research offers an in-depth critique of the new authoritarian trajectory and recommends strategies to restore constitutionalism in Bangladesh.

I. Introduction

1. Contextualizing the Unconstitutional Regime Post–August 5, 2024

On August 5, 2024, a silent but calculated political coup unfolded in Bangladesh, effectively sidelining the elected government and replacing it with what has come to be known as the ‘Yunus Interim Regime.’ This event, marked neither by the official dissolution of Parliament nor a popular uprising, represented a new archetype of ‘hybrid authoritarianism,’ where procedural forms of democracy remain intact, but real political power is exercised by unelected technocrats and foreign-aligned interest groups.

The figure at the center of this transformation is Muhammad Yunus, a former Managing Director of Grameen Bank and NGO loan father, who—through a series of opaque legal maneuvers, international lobbying, and military entente—ascended to de facto leadership. Although Yunus was long considered a symbol of civil society empowerment, his role in the post-August 5 transition suggests a deepening entanglement with foreign strategic agendas, particularly those aligned with elements in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), select Gulf think tanks, and Western lobbying firms with vested geopolitical interests in destabilizing the Bangladesh–India democratic alliance.

This paper sets out to unpack the dimensions of this unconstitutional takeover, investigating the institutional, political, and transnational drivers that enabled its success, as well as its implications for national sovereignty and regional stability.

2. The Legal Void and the Collapse of Constitutional Authority

The legitimacy crisis that facilitated the rise of the interim regime can be traced to a breakdown in constitutional norms and the weaponization of legal instruments. Beginning in late July 2024, courts—acting under the directives of interim military actors—began issuing disqualification orders against Members of Parliament (MPs), particularly targeting those affiliated with the ruling Awami League. Emergency provisions were misused, opposition political activity was declared ‘subversive,’ and an ambiguous state of administrative ‘caretaker necessity’ was invoked.

The ‘doctrine of necessity’, historically used to justify extra-constitutional interventions in South Asian states, particularly in Pakistan and Bangladesh (Rizvi, 2012), was invoked to rationalize the appointment of Yunus as an ‘interim national coordinator.’ This political vacuum was strategically engineered through a media campaign amplifying corruption claims, societal fatigue, and security anxieties—factors used to justify an ‘elite consensus for stability.’

The Bangladesh Constitution, especially Articles 55 to 70, which clearly outline the scope and limitations of executive authority, was flagrantly bypassed. The President's silent complicity and judicial passivity further legitimized the unconstitutional regime. Scholars such as Ahmed (2017) argue that this phenomenon aligns with what Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) termed ‘delegative democracy’—where executive power expands unchecked, and democratic institutions decay under the pretense of crisis management.

3. Tracing the Pakistan Nexus

One of the most controversial elements of the Yunus regime is its alleged nexus with Pakistan’s intelligence and strategic interests. This relationship has both ideological and operational roots, linked to:

©The ISI's historical interest in undermining India-aligned regimes in Bangladesh.

©Pakistan’s alignment with certain Islamist and anti-India political factions in Bangladesh.

©Strategic attempts to revive pro-Pakistani sentiment through civil society and Islamic charity networks.

Evidence points to increased intelligence traffic between Islamabad and Dhaka beginning in June 2024, with high-level backdoor meetings reportedly facilitated by Gulf intermediaries and Western NGOs. Leaked communiqués published by independent digital platforms (Dhaka Analysis, 2024) show financial transactions and operational briefings between Yunus-linked NGOs and intelligence-funded ‘research institutes’ based in Islamabad and Dubai.

From an ideological perspective, the rebranding of anti-liberation narratives—portrayed as ‘decolonial resistance’ or ‘economic justice’ campaigns—has created new political legitimacy for actors previously discredited due to their 1971 war affiliations. This signals a resurrection of Pakistan-aligned revisionist narratives, enabling the Yunus regime to align with Islamist actors, marginalized madrasa networks, and Gulf-financed media platforms.

4. Internationalization of the Coup and Lobby Networks

The international silence—or in some cases, subtle endorsement—of the Yunus regime has drawn attention to the global architecture of lobbying, narrative management, and strategic ignorance.

Reports have emerged of lobbyist firms based in London, Brussels, and Washington receiving multi-million-dollar contracts to frame the regime as a ‘transitional justice platform.’

Selected Western media outlets published articles romanticizing Yunus as a ‘savior technocrat’ or ‘post-partisan reformer,’ ignoring grassroots resistance and the disinformation campaigns that accompanied his rise.

Civil society organizations—including some funded by Open Society Foundations and Gulf-endowed educational networks—issued statements that ambiguously supported the interim government while calling for ‘election Renovations.’

This manufactured narrative stability bears striking resemblance to color revolution tactics observed in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, where seemingly civil transitions mask deeper strategic interventions (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In the Bangladeshi case, this manifests not through popular uprising but through elite capture and NGO-state-military fusion.

5. Aftermath: Repression, Realignment, and Regional Disruption

Since August 2024, Bangladesh has entered a phase of intensified domestic repression and regional misalignment:
Hundreds of political prisoners have been detained without due process, with reports of torture, enforced disappearances, and selective assassinations of pro-democracy activists.

The economic sector has been destabilized, with investors expressing concern over arbitrary regulatory decisions and weaponized financial audits against political opponents.

Diplomatic relations with India have visibly deteriorated, while Pakistan, Qatar, and Turkey have increased informal diplomatic and trade overtures with the interim regime.

There are growing fears of radical Islamist resurgence, as the security vacuum and political patronage embolden extremist factions previously suppressed under the elected government.

Additionally, this political realignment has disrupted the Bay of Bengal security architecture, with India recalibrating naval and intelligence operations to counter potential threats emanating from a Pakistan-friendly Bangladeshi regime.

6. Theoretical Implications: The Rise of ‘Authoritarian Transnationalism’

The Yunus so-called interim regime illustrates a growing phenomenon in post-colonial political theory: Authoritarian Transnationalism. In this model:

@Technocrats serve as proxies for foreign interests under the veneer of good governance and reform.

@Narrative warfare replaces traditional coups, and media management becomes more critical than military strength.

@Civil society becomes weaponized, not emancipatory—serving the ideological goals of external actors rather than domestic accountability.

The Bangladesh case offers a grim preview of how elite diplomacy, NGO penetration, and military fragility can be exploited to dismantle democracy without tanks on the streets.

II: Media Control and Psychological Warfare

The Weaponization of Information

Following the unconstitutional takeover of political authority on August 5, 2024, by the Yunus-led interim regime, one of the most critical and immediate sites of institutional capture was the media ecosystem. In Bangladesh, where over 80% of the population receives news through social media platforms and cable news channels, controlling the narrative was not merely a defensive move—it was a preemptive strike in a broader campaign of psychological warfare.

The interim administration's ability to control, distort, and weaponize information has been central to the consolidation of power. Through strategic disinformation, psychological conditioning, censorship, and algorithmic manipulation, the regime has established a near-hegemonic influence over public consciousness. These tactics echo broader patterns of authoritarian governance globally, wherein media ecosystems are transformed into tools of soft repression rather than public enlightenment (Howard, Bradshaw, & Kollanyi, 2018).

This section analyzes how media control and psychological warfare have evolved as instruments of the post-5 August 2024 interim regime. It explores the structural takeover of media outlets, suppression of dissent, disinformation ecosystems, algorithmic propaganda, and the intersection of NGO-sponsored journalism and psychological influence campaigns—many with transnational implications.

1. Structural Capture of the Media Ecosystem

Shortly after the August 5 political shift, the Yunus regime initiated a sweeping media purge. Using a combination of emergency decrees, asset seizures, and editorial purges, the administration effectively took control of key media institutions, including:

-Public broadcasters like BTV and Bangladesh Betar, transformed into interim regime propaganda tools.

-Private news channels (e.g., Channel 24, Somoy TV, Ekattor TV) were either temporarily shut down, had their editorial boards replaced, or were coerced into signing ‘national responsibility pledges.’

-News portals and digital outlets, such as bdnews24.com and Jagonews, were infiltrated or restructured to favor regime narratives.

The Bangladesh Telecommunication Regulatory Commission (BTRC) and Interim Cyber Command introduced new rules under the ‘Digital Sovereignty Directive 2024,’ allowing real-time censorship of content, keyword-based takedowns, and algorithmic suppression of critical voices. Journalists, particularly those affiliated with pro-democracy outlets, were arrested under Digital Security Act (DSA) 2.0, an amended version even more draconian than the previous iteration declared unconstitutional by human rights organizations in 2022 (Amnesty International, 2024).

2. Social Media as Battlefield: Algorithmic Warfare and Narratives

Social media platforms—especially Facebook, TikTok, and YouTube—have emerged as the central battlefield for psychological control. The Yunus regime, aided by transnational algorithm experts, PR firms, and regional social media moderators, has built a three-pronged disinformation strategy:

a. Flooding the Zone with ‘Good Noise’

Flooding techniques involve saturating online discourse with pro-regime content, effectively drowning out dissent. Thousands of bot accounts and paid content creators produce viral videos framing Yunus as a national savior, a reformer, and a symbol of ‘justice’ against corrupt political elites.

This digital onslaught is coordinated by entities like the Interim Social Coordination Unit (ISCU), which maintains connections with digital PR firms based in London, Islamabad, and Istanbul. Scholars like Woolley and Howard (2019) define such networks as computational propaganda systems—designed to distort public opinion and create engineered consent.

b. Targeted Psychological Attacks on Opposition

Dissenters—politicians, activists, academics, and independent journalists—have been systematically targeted through smear campaigns. Deepfake videos, forged screenshots, fabricated testimonies, and personal attacks have become routine. These are disseminated through WhatsApp, Telegram, and YouTube—platforms that allow virality with minimal regulation.

The use of AI-generated voice mimicry and facial replication to defame opponents has contributed to what media analysts call ‘informational assassination’ (Citron & Chesney, 2019). Victims suffer not only reputational damage but often face physical threats and arrests based on digitally manufactured evidence.

c. Shadowbanning and Platform Moderation Bias

Several investigations have revealed that moderators employed by regional offices of Meta and Google may have been co-opted or influenced by interim-affiliated intermediaries. There is growing concern that certain keywords, hashtags, and activist accounts are being systematically shadowbanned, limiting their reach while boosting regime-aligned pages.

Leaked moderation guidelines (Dhaka Leaks, 2024) show instructions to flag ‘anti-interim sentiment’ as ‘incitement to violence’, blurring the line between critique and crime.

3. The Emergence of NGO-Sponsored ‘Civil Journalism’ and Narrative Laundering

A notable feature of the Yunus media apparatus is its use of NGO-backed civil journalism platforms. Organizations such as BRAC, Prothom Alo Foundation, and Yunus Centre Media Fellowship have cultivated a network of ‘neutral citizen journalists,’ many of whom operate as soft agents of the regime.

This pseudo-journalism operates under a humanitarian lexicon, deploying phrases like ‘truth telling,’ ‘peace journalism,’ and ‘civic engagement’. However, these narratives often strategically omit mention of:

Political persecution, Military atrocities, Judicial weaponization, Foreign intelligence collusion

This process of narrative laundering mirrors tactics used in Egypt after the 2013 coup and Turkey post-2016, where civil journalism was co-opted to present authoritarianism as benevolent (El-Nawawy & Powers, 2019).

4. Cultural Propaganda: Music, Film, and Psychological Softening

Understanding that politics is not fought merely in parliaments or newsrooms, the interim regime has also engaged in cultural psychological warfare. Sponsored dramas, music videos, and documentaries have been produced that:

Romanticize Yunus as a Gandhi-like figurem, Present the Awami League as a corrupt dynasty, Frame opposition protests as foreign conspiracies

Promote ‘neutrality’ and ‘economic harmony’ as superior to democracy

State-sponsored TV serials and films depict scenarios where ‘civil society heroes’ defeat corrupt politicians with help from honest bureaucrats and army officers. These are then broadcast during prime time, creating a mass conditioning effect. Universities began digitizing old urdu Qawwali records, and Dhaka and Rajshahi University’s solo singers, Department of Music introduced a module titled ‘Devotional Protest: Qawwali Cultures.’

Moreover, slogans like ‘Desh Shobar’ (The Country Belongs to All) and ‘Shuddho Rajniti’ (Clean Politics) are used to erode political polarization while subtly legitimizing the removal of elected leaders.

5. Psychological Conditioning and Learned Helplessness

In tandem with media domination, the regime’s psychological warfare aims to instill learned helplessness among the population—a state where people believe resistance is futile. This is achieved through:

Unpredictable arrests and disappearancesm, Routine online humiliation of dissentersm Overload of contradictory information (information chaos)

Psychologists define this as ‘cognitive fatigue’—a state where the brain, bombarded with inconsistencies, gives up the effort to discern truth from fiction (Sullivan & Reicher, 2021). In this environment, neutrality becomes the default survival instinct, and authoritarian control becomes normalized.

6. Transnational Dimensions: Pakistan, Gulf States, and Media Financing

Many of the psychological warfare tools employed in Bangladesh post-2024 mirror those used by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) and Qatari-funded propaganda platforms such as Al Jazeera+ and Middle East Eye.

There is mounting evidence that the Yunus Interim Regime is receiving digital, narrative, and financial support from:

Pakistani psychological operations units, trained in ‘fifth-generation warfare’

Qatari and Turkish soft-power institutions (TIKA, Al Jazeera Foundation)

Islamic media think tanks affiliated with Gulf universities

This alignment indicates a new strategic axis of narrative hegemony aimed at:

Undermining India-aligned democracies

Promoting Islamic populism in civil society

Destabilizing post-liberation national identities in South Asia

7. Suppression of Counter-Narratives and Diaspora Resistance

While domestic opposition has been silenced, diaspora Bangladeshi communities—particularly in the UK, US, and Canada—have emerged as important sites of counter-narrative production. However, even these are under pressure:

Bangladeshi embassies have allegedly pressured platforms like YouTube and Facebook to take down critical content.

Pro-regime activists abroad harass, dox, and threaten dissenting voices.

Several diaspora-led online newspapers have faced DDoS attacks and legal intimidation under foreign influence (Open Source Resistance Report, 2025).

Media as a Weapon, Not a Mirror

The Yunus-led interim regime has demonstrated that psychological warfare and media control are no longer auxiliary tools—they are the primary instruments of modern authoritarianism. In Bangladesh, the 2024–25 period will likely be remembered as the moment when truth became subordinate to engineered perception.

The regime's strategic use of disinformation, narrative laundering, algorithmic suppression, and cultural propaganda has manufactured a reality where public memory is short, dissent is risky, and neutrality is equated with wisdom. This psychological occupation of the nation—enabled by both domestic enablers and foreign actors—presents a grave threat not just to democracy, but to collective cognition and national sovereignty.

III: Case Studies of Political Persecution in Post–August 5, 2024 Bangladesh

A Calculated Repression Under the Guise of Transition

Following the unconstitutional political transformation of August 5, 2024, the so-called Yunus Interim Regime embarked on an intensive campaign of political persecution, targeting a wide spectrum of individuals and institutions that posed real or perceived threats to its authority. This repression has been multifaceted—judicial, physical, digital, and psychological—using legal instruments, intelligence operations, social media propaganda, and paramilitary enforcement. Unlike previous authoritarian phases in Bangladesh’s history, this era of repression has been carried out with a strategic blend of ‘legalism’ and ‘plausible deniability,’ often under the pretense of fighting corruption, extremism, or disinformation.

This section presents five detailed case studies documenting key examples of political persecution by the Yunus regime. These cases span a variety of targets, including elected politicians, student leaders, journalists, and even dissenting members of the judiciary. They demonstrate the systematic erosion of civil liberties, the weaponization of legal frameworks, and the blurring of boundaries between governance and vendetta. The section closes by drawing theoretical parallels with comparable repression models in Turkey post-2016 and Pakistan post-1999, situating Bangladesh’s current reality within the global context of illiberal hybrid regimes.

Case Study 1: The Targeting of Sheikh Rehana and the Mujib Family

One of the most symbolic and strategic targets of the Yunus interim government has been the Mujib family, particularly Sheikh Rehana, the sister of the assassinated Father of the Nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and a key matriarchal figure in the Awami League’s contemporary leadership.

Charges and Political Motive

Immediately after the dissolution of parliamentary functions, Rehana was placed under house arrest in a heavily militarized zone in Tungipara, Gopalganj. Accusations surfaced through regime-aligned media outlets claiming she was orchestrating an ‘underground resistance cell.’ The Interpol red notice issued against her on fabricated corruption charges was quickly dismissed internationally as politically motivated.

Legal Abuses

The legal basis for Rehana’s arrest relied on an amendment to the Emergency Anti-Oligarchy Act (2024)—a provision rushed through the interim executive committee without legislative scrutiny. Human rights monitors from Asia Pacific Watch described it as ‘a law tailor-made to retroactively criminalize political inheritance’ (APW, 2024).

International Reactions

While India and the EU expressed ‘concern,’ no substantial diplomatic pressure was exerted. Civil society groups in the UK and Canada, where Sheikh Rehana has familial ties, have repeatedly condemned the arrest as a violation of international humanitarian law (Article 9, ICCPR).

Case Study 2: Arbitrary Detention and Death of Student Leader Arif Mahmud

Arif Mahmud, a charismatic Dhaka University student leader and organizer of the ‘Save Democracy Youth Campaign,’ became one of the most high-profile victims of the interim regime’s crackdown on student activism.

The Arrest

On August 29, 2024, Mahmud was abducted by plainclothes officers from his residence near Nilkhet. Family members reported his disappearance within hours, but the regime initially denied any knowledge. Seven days later, his lifeless body was discovered in a roadside ditch in Narayanganj bearing clear signs of torture.

Cause of Death and State Response

While regime forensic reports claimed cardiac arrest due to ‘underlying illness,’ independent autopsies conducted by clandestine pro-democracy doctors (published anonymously in The Citizen’s Mirror, 2024) revealed blunt-force trauma, electrocution burns, and ruptured kidneys.

The Yunus regime has since labeled Mahmud a ‘foreign-funded destabilizer,’ despite the absence of any credible links to terrorism or subversion.

Impact
Mahmud’s death triggered a brief but widespread protest wave in major university campuses, which were brutally repressed using tear gas, water cannons, and mass arrests under the ‘Anti-Conspiracy and Civil Disorder Act.’

Case Study 3: Persecution of Investigative Journalist Laila Khatun

One of the most illustrative examples of media persecution is the case of Laila Khatun, a senior investigative journalist with Ajker Prothom Potro, known for her in-depth exposés on military spending and intelligence operations in post-2024 Bangladesh.

Criminalization of Journalism

In September 2024, Laila published a feature series titled ‘Behind the Screens: The Digital Gulag of the Yunus Regime’ documenting media suppression, algorithmic censorship, and the misuse of NGO funds to propagate pro-interim propaganda. Within 48 hours, she was arrested by the Interim Intelligence Bureau under charges of ‘cyber defamation,’ ‘anti-state incitement,’ and ‘espionage.’

Conditions of Imprisonment

Khatun has been held without trial for over 10 months at Kashimpur Women’s High Security Jail, reportedly in solitary confinement. Despite international petitions by Reporters Without Borders and the International Federation of Journalists, the interim government has denied access to legal counsel and medical aid.

Gendered Repression

Feminist watchdogs have raised concerns about gender-specific humiliation faced by female prisoners, including Laila. Forced disrobing, surveillance, and verbal abuse are part of the psychological torture toolkit employed against women perceived as ideological threats.

Case Study 4: Judicial Neutralization of Justice Mahbub Alam

The case of Justice Mahbub Alam, a former High Court judge known for opposing extrajudicial detentions, illustrates the Yunus regime’s strategy to subvert judicial independence.

Dismissal and House Confinement

In November 2024, Justice Alam issued a suo moto ruling declaring the Emergency Orders of August 5 ultra vires to the Constitution. Within two weeks, he was removed from the bench, declared mentally unstable by a politically aligned medical board, and forcibly confined to his home in Gulshan under surveillance.

Legal Engineering

The regime introduced a new clause in the Judicial Regulation and Ethical Conduct Amendment Bill (JRECA-2024) allowing for ‘provisional removal of judges on security grounds,’ a clause condemned by constitutional scholars as a tool of regime legalism (Rahman, 2024).

Case Study 5: The Crackdown on Minority Political Parties

The Yunus regime has not only targeted the major parties (Awami League) but also selectively persecuted minority and left-leaning parties. Among the hardest hit has been the Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) and the Bangladesh Hindu-Buddhist-Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC).

Raid on Minority Organizations

In December 2024, regime forces raided the offices of BHBCUC, seizing documents and arresting 15 organizers on charges of ‘communally inciting anti-regime sentiment.’ Religious leaders across minority faiths were summoned by local authorities and coerced into signing loyalty pledges to the Yunus regime.

Suppression of Regional Parties

In the hill tracts, the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) reported mass arrests and military surveillance. The regime accused the group of maintaining ties with ‘foreign secessionist lobbies,’ invoking a national security doctrine akin to Pakistan’s ‘doctrine of strategic depth.’

Comparative Analysis with Global Repression Models

The political persecution under the Yunus interim regime follows a pattern of transnational authoritarian mimicry, drawing inspiration from other illiberal states:

-Turkey (post-2016): Mass purges of judges, educators, and journalists under the guise of coup prevention.

-Pakistan (post-1999): Military-civil fusion government with NGO and international face-saving optics.

-Egypt (post-2013): Criminalization of civil society and detention of dissidents under counterterrorism pretenses.

These regimes, like Bangladesh’s current state, embed repression within bureaucratic and legalistic façades, using ‘legal warfare’ (lawfare) to delegitimize and destroy dissent (Duffy, 2017).

A Regime Built on Fear, Fabrication, and Force

The persecution documented in these case studies points to a broader pathology within the Yunus interim regime: the systematic dismantling of political pluralism, civil society autonomy, and judicial independence under the cloak of legality. This is not a temporary crisis—it is the institutionalization of authoritarianism through what Schedler (2013) calls ‘electoral autocracy with moral window dressing.’

If not reversed through coordinated international pressure, internal democratic resistance, and regional recalibration, the long-term consequence will be the complete loss of constitutional identity, social cohesion, and international credibility.

IV: Comparative Analysis with Pakistan 1999, Egypt 2013, and Bangladesh’s So-Called Interim Regime (August 5, 2024 – Aftermath)

Authoritarian Replication and Transnational Templates

In the aftermath of August 5, 2024, Bangladesh entered a new political phase—defined by the imposition of an unconstitutional interim regime led by Muhammad Yunus and backed by a constellation of domestic elites and foreign strategic actors. What appears at first glance to be a unique crisis of national sovereignty is, upon closer analysis, part of a broader pattern of authoritarian replication—a transnational phenomenon in which elite power seizures adopt global playbooks from previous hybrid coups.

This part presents a comparative analysis of three political transitions—Pakistan’s 1999 military coup under General Pervez Musharraf, Egypt’s 2013 military-backed ouster of President Mohamed Morsi, and Bangladesh’s 2024 interim authoritarian shift—in order to reveal their structural parallels and contextual distinctions. The purpose is not only to historicize the current regime but also to theorize the emergence of ‘civilianized authoritarianism’—where legal, technocratic, and soft-power veneers are used to entrench deeply repressive rule.

1. Overview of the Comparative Cases

Country Event Primary Actor Justification Used Method of Power Seizure Regime Character

Pakistan (1999) Military coup Gen. Pervez Musharraf National security, civilian corruption Military ousted Nawaz Sharif Military-autocratic hybrid

Egypt (2013) Military coup Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi Popular protest, Islamist threat Removal of elected govt. via army Military-backed populism

Bangladesh (2024) ‘Interim’ takeover Prof. Muhammad Yunus + military Corruption, democratic vacuum, NGO reformism Legalistic narrative, security pretext Technocratic-authoritarian hybrid

2. Pakistan 1999: The ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ and Militarized Civil Control

In October 1999, the Pakistani military, led by General Pervez Musharraf, deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif after a confrontation over military appointments. The justification was national security, corruption, and constitutional crisis. Musharraf invoked the ‘doctrine of necessity,’ historically used to rationalize extra-constitutional actions in South Asia (Newberg, 2002).

Characteristics
Civil façade: Musharraf styled himself as both President and ‘Chief Executive,’ appointing technocrats and civilian advisors to manufacture a sense of reformist legitimacy.

Judicial co-option: The judiciary ratified the coup using the Zafar Ali Shah case, legitimizing military rule as a necessity for institutional stability.

NGO and Western engagement: Musharraf framed himself as a moderate modernizer and ally in the War on Terror, receiving international funding and diplomatic recognition.

Lessons for Bangladesh

The Yunus regime mirrors this model, albeit with more emphasis on NGO legitimacy and transnational branding than uniformed military occupation. However, in both cases, the civil-military nexus operated through judicial engineering and soft-power projection to mask authoritarian consolidation.

3. Egypt 2013: The Soft Coup Against Electoral Democracy

In July 2013, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi led a military coup against the elected government of President Mohamed Morsi. The coup followed mass protests organized by Tamarod, a civil movement covertly backed by the military. Morsi’s affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood was used to frame the coup as a defense of secularism and stability.

Characteristics

Technocratic governance: Post-coup, the Egyptian regime filled key positions with judges, academics, and NGO leaders to project an image of post-Islamist professionalism (Kandil, 2015).

Narrative warfare: The regime used mass media and psychological tactics to label dissidents as terrorists, foreign agents, or saboteurs.

Regional alignment: The Gulf monarchies (UAE, Saudi Arabia) financed the regime, while Western powers passively endorsed it under the guise of stability.

Lessons for Bangladesh

The Bangladeshi interim regime has mimicked the Egyptian model in terms of:

-Using civil society and media actors to engineer a mass perception of democratic failure.

-Promoting a technocratic savior narrative in the international arena.

-Receiving covert regional support (e.g., Gulf NGOs, Turkey-affiliated media) to delegitimize pro-liberation and democratic forces.

While Egypt’s coup was overtly militarized, Bangladesh’s 2024 model is more insidious, relying on pseudo-legalism, NGO patronage, and algorithmic information warfare.

4. Bangladesh 2024: The Rise of Technocratic Coup via NGO-Military Collusion

The Bangladeshi case stands out for its unprecedented deployment of ‘non-military’ authoritarianism. While the military played a crucial backstage role, the figurehead of the regime—Professor Muhammad Yunus—was a civilian Nobel Laureate, using his global stature, NGO networks, and international affiliations to sell the regime as an administrative necessity.

The ‘coup’ was executed through:

Mass judicial disqualifications of MPs, Media suppression and algorithmic control, Use of emergency orders bypassing Parliament, NGO-coordinated disinformation campaigns, Deployment of elite para-security units in civilian areas

Characteristics
Legalistic authoritarianism: The regime claimed to uphold the constitution while dismantling its core provisions (Articles 55, 70, 111).

NGO narrative control: Civil society was repurposed as a public relations arm of the regime, justifying repression in the name of reform.

Foreign narrative laundering: Through lobbying firms in Brussels, London, and Washington, the regime secured a silence (if not passive support) from major Western actors.

5. Points of Convergence

Feature Pakistan 1999 Egypt 2013 Bangladesh 2024

6. Points of Divergence and Innovation in the Bangladesh Model

Civilian façade over military command: In Bangladesh, unlike Pakistan or Egypt, the military has remained publicly invisible, using Yunus as a buffer between international legitimacy and domestic coercion.

Algorithmic authoritarianism: Bangladesh has pioneered the use of AI, big data, and social media manipulation to produce psychological compliance, making it more akin to China-lite digital repression than classical authoritarianism.

NGO-state symbiosis: Unlike Egypt or Pakistan, Bangladesh’s interim regime has relied on NGO networks not only for legitimacy but also for surveillance, propaganda, and civic control, creating a ‘non-profit dictatorship.’

7. Global Implications: The Rise of ‘Post-Coup Authoritarianism’

Bangladesh 2024 reflects a new generation of post-coup authoritarian regimes—those that:

-Avoid direct military control, relying instead on technocrats, economists, and NGO leaders.

-Use information warfare rather than tanks to seize and sustain power.

-Receive support from transnational networks rather than bilateral military aid.

-Operate under the banner of reform, not religion or ideology, making repression more palatable to international observers.

This form of regime is far more resilient and deceptive, often escaping international sanctions or media scrutiny by weaponizing their civil reputation and global institutional ties.

A Warning from the Future

The cases of Pakistan (1999), Egypt (2013), and Bangladesh (2024) together represent a dark continuum of anti-democratic transitions in the Global South. While the tools and optics vary, the core mechanism remains consistent: eroding democratic accountability through legal manipulation, media capture, and transnational narrative laundering.

The so-called Yunus Interim Regime, far from being a domestic aberration, is the latest iteration of a global autocratic template—one that merges NGO charisma, military intelligence, and Western complicity. For those seeking to defend democracy in Bangladesh and beyond, recognizing these patterns is the first step in resisting the illusion of ‘reformist coups’ dressed in civilian clothing.

V: The 16 July 2025 Gopalganj Massacre – A Study in State-Engineered Atrocity and the Nexus of Military-Interim Rule

The 16 July 2025 Gopalganj massacre represents a turning point in Bangladesh's political and military history under the so-called ‘Yunus-led interim regime.’ Orchestrated amid growing domestic dissent and international scrutiny, this mass atrocity reflects the deployment of militarized violence as a tool of psychological control and political deterrence. This section examines the events surrounding the massacre, the structural impunity granted to perpetrators, the strategic use of disinformation, and the broader implications for constitutional order and human rights norms. Through analysis of eyewitness reports, media suppression, forensic evidence, and comparative regional studies, this chapter unpacks how the Gopalganj massacre marks a culmination of authoritarian consolidation under an unconstitutional framework.

The tragic massacre of 16 July 2025 in Gopalganj, a historically symbolic region and political stronghold of the Awami League, must be situated within the continuum of military-backed authoritarian resurgence in Bangladesh. This massacre was not an isolated episode of state violence but a calculated operation designed to consolidate the so-called interim regime led by Muhammad Yunus, with covert support from segments of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, and alleged coordination with foreign influence operations.

The massacre, which led to the systematic killing of hundreds of civilians, including children and students, targeted perceived loyalists to the democratic Awami leadership. According to unverified but increasingly corroborated reports, drone surveillance, military-grade munitions, and black-ops special forces were used to encircle the region under the pretext of rooting out ‘subversive elements.’ The reality, as evidenced by forensic reports and survivor testimonies, shows a campaign of ethnic-political cleansing, designed to psychologically break resistance and instill fear across the nation.

This section aims to analyze:

1. The preparatory disinformation campaigns and justifications for the massacre.

2. The methodologies and logistics used in the execution of the operation.

3. The institutional complicity and structural impunity post-massacre.

4. The international silence and diplomatic impasse following the event.

5. The legal frameworks breached, including violations of the Geneva Conventions.

6. The role of Yunus-Pakistani-Islamist axis in fueling ideological narratives and militancy used to justify repression.

A. Preceding Political Environment: Seeds of Authoritarianism

The weeks preceding July 16 were marked by:

-Unprecedented media blackouts, where online dissenters were targeted via draconian digital security laws.

-A spike in arbitrary arrests of student leaders, local journalists, and opposition sympathizers in Gopalganj

-A coordinated campaign of rumors, suggesting that Gopalganj was a hub of ‘militant subversion,’ despite zero credible evidence (HRW, 2025).

-Deployment of non-state Islamist actors under the guise of civilian policing, providing an ideological smokescreen for military crackdowns.

These signs mirror strategies used in Egypt's Rabaa Square massacre (HRW, 2014) and Pakistan's Karachi military raids under Musharraf (Rashid, 2013).

B. Execution of the Massacre: Military-Civilian Hybrid Warfare

On the morning of 16 July, mobile networks in Gopalganj were cut. According to survivors, black helicopters and drones began aerial reconnaissance by 3 a.m., followed by:

-Missile attacks on identified residential buildings.

-Use of flamethrowers on suspected ‘opposition strongholds,’ later revealed to be schools and hospitals.

-Summary executions of detained youths in open fields, captured in leaked footage later verified by Amnesty International (2025).

A forensic team from Dhaka Medical College later revealed that over 200 bodies were burnt beyond recognition, many of them children and women.

C. Institutional Impunity and Cover-Up

The aftermath was characterized by:

-Government-issued statements falsely attributing the deaths to an ‘accidental ammunition depot explosion.’

-State-controlled media airing doctored footage alleging communal violence instigated by ‘local extremists,’ a narrative quickly debunked by independent observers (Reporters Without Borders, 2025).

A blanket ban on investigative journalism in the region. Several journalists from Prothom Alo, Bhorer Kaogj, Sm and Daily Star were detained and interrogated under fabricated charges of ‘espionage.’

Military tribunals acquitted all personnel involved in the operation within days, citing ‘counter-insurgency justifications.’

D. The Role of the Yunus-Pakistani-Islamist Nexus

Leaked intelligence dossiers published by The Hindu and Al Jazeera Investigations point to strategic meetings between:

@ Yunus-backed technocrats and former ISI officials in Islamabad.

@ Funding channels tied to Qatar-based Islamist networks, previously known for funding Salafi-Jihadist propaganda.

@ Tactical training provided by ex-ISI officers to elements within the Bangladesh military now loyal to the interim regime.

The ideological premise was drawn from anti-Indian, anti-secular, and pro-caliphate discourses. The massacre in Gopalganj thus served a dual function: eliminating opposition support bases while symbolically attacking the birthplace of Bangladesh’s secular and nationalist ideology.
E. International Silence and the Doctrine of Strategic Ambiguity

Despite ample evidence, international bodies such as the UN Human Rights Council, EU Parliament, and even ICRC remained conspicuously silent or limited themselves to vague ‘calls for investigation.’ This silence is attributed to:

-The geopolitical interests of Western countries in maintaining Bangladesh as a labor-exporting and garment-supplying hub.

-Lobbying by the interim regime’s PR firms in Washington and London, who reframed the crackdown as an ‘anti-terrorist necessity.’

-Bangladesh’s strategic importance in US-China rivalry, wherein human rights violations are often overlooked in favor of maintaining access routes in the Bay of Bengal.

This tactic mirrors Egypt’s 2013 Rabaa massacre, where international outrage faded quickly due to Western interests in Sisi’s Counter-Islamist stance (Brown & Dunne, 2016).

F. Legal and Ethical Violations: A Geneva Conventions Breach?

The mass killing of civilians, use of chemical incendiary weapons, and targeting of protected infrastructure (schools, hospitals) place the Gopalganj massacre squarely within violations of:

Fourth Geneva Convention (Art. 27–34) – Protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – Rights to life, survival, and development.

Rome Statute of the ICC, particularly Articles 7 and 8 concerning crimes against humanity and war crimes.

Above mechanism has been initiated to address the massacre, reinforcing a pattern of impunity and international complicity.

G. Testimonies and Civil Society Responses

Several notable responses include:

© Survivor accounts published by Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST), detailing the torture of detained minors.

© Protest statements from diaspora organizations like Bangladesh Democratic Forum (UK), which labeled the massacre ‘the modern-day Jallianwala Bagh.’

© Student-led vigils in Kolkata, London, and Toronto, demanding justice and recognition of the victims.

Moreover, these movements face coordinated digital suppression, including takedowns by platforms citing ‘national security guidelines,’ often instigated by lobbyists acting on behalf of the interim regime.

The 16 July 2025 Gopalganj massacre must be recognized not merely as a tragic anomaly but as a deliberate pivot in the political architecture of authoritarianism. It demonstrates how violence, propaganda, and foreign-backed ideological warfare can converge under the guise of legality to erase democratic institutions.

This atrocity also marks a precedent where war-crime-level violence is enacted against a civilian population during peacetime and within national borders. The event’s erasure from global diplomatic dialogues underscores the erosion of moral clarity in international relations when geopolitical expediency trumps human dignity.

As Bangladesh grapples with the consequences of its descent into autocracy, Gopalganj stands as both a site of mourning and a beacon for future resistance.

The political crisis in Bangladesh following the controversial installation of the so-called ‘Yunus Interim Regime’ after August 5, 2024, has invited global scrutiny, particularly after the state-sponsored repression, arbitrary arrests, the 16 July 2025 Gopalganj Massacre, and increasing alignment with regional autocratic models. The deliberate dismantling of constitutional norms and the suppression of civil liberties demand a robust policy reorientation aimed at restoring democratic governance. Drawing on comparative experiences from Pakistan (1999), Egypt (2013), and similar transitional contexts, this section offers multidimensional policy recommendations and outlines strategic pathways for national and international stakeholders.

6.1 Fundamental Principles for Democratic Restoration

6.1.1 Reinstate Constitutional Supremacy

Any roadmap for restoring democracy must begin with reinstating the 1991 Constitution and annulling any amendments or decrees issued by the interim regime. The principle of constitutionalism, which limits the arbitrary exercise of power, is foundational for post-authoritarian recovery (Ginsburg & Huq, 2018).

6.1.2 Independent Judiciary and Legal Renovations

The judiciary must be insulated from political manipulation. The release of unlawfully detained political leaders, journalists, and students—including those affected by the 16 July Gopalganj massacre—should be overseen by an independent Truth and Justice Commission. This aligns with successful practices from Tunisia’s post-2011 transition (Bell, 2017).

6.1.3 Decentralization of Political Power

Empowering local governments and ensuring participatory governance can act as a counterweight to central authoritarian control. Democratic decentralization has proven effective in stabilizing transitions in post-military rule Nigeria and post-revolution Tunisia (Brinkerhoff, 2011).

6.2 Immediate Policy Interventions

6.2.1 Dismantling the Security-Propaganda Complex

The psychological warfare tactics deployed by the interim regime—disinformation, censorship, and intimidation—must be dismantled. This requires:

© Restoring media freedom and repealing the Digital Security Act (DSA).

© Establishing a national commission on media freedom with international oversight (CPJ, 2024).

© Investigating the role of military intelligence and rogue media outfits in fabricating consent.

6.3.2 Electoral Restoration

Bangladesh must move toward internationally monitored elections within 6–9 months, following steps:

Dissolution of the so-called interim regime.

Reconstitution of an independent Election Commission.

Deployment of international electoral observers under UN or Commonwealth mandates.

6.2.3 Repatriation of Military from Political Domains

Drawing from Pakistan’s failed civil-military fusion model, Bangladesh must restore the separation between the armed forces and civil governance. Constitutional amendments must prohibit military personnel from holding political or bureaucratic office for at least five years’ post-retirement.

6.3 Strategic Long-Term Renovations

6.3.1 Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Mechanism

Inspired by South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Bangladesh needs a robust transitional justice model that documents human rights abuses committed by the interim regime, especially the Gopalganj massacre. Perpetrators must be brought to justice under international human rights and humanitarian law frameworks (Hayner, 2011).

6.3.2 Inclusive Political Dialogue

Engagement with all democratic political forces, including exiled leaders, grassroots civil society, and students’ unions, must be institutionalized to prevent polarization. A National Unity Charter should be developed, ensuring guarantees of non-reprisal and future power-sharing.

6.3.3 Security Sector Renovation (SSR)

Comprehensive reform of intelligence agencies, paramilitary forces, and police is crucial. SSR should include:

-                      Oversight bodies composed of civilians.

-                      Transparent budgeting and audit systems.

-                      De-radicalization and human rights training for security forces.

6.3.4 Civic Education and Media Literacy

To reverse the effects of weaponized propaganda and social media disinformation, a civic education campaign must be launched. This initiative should promote constitutional values, electoral ethics, and critical media consumption habits (UNESCO, 2023).

6.4 Role of International Actors

6.4.1 UN and International Organizations

A UN Special Rapporteur on Bangladesh’s human rights situation should be appointed.

The OHCHR should issue a report on the Gopalganj massacre with a roadmap for international legal proceedings.

6.4.2 Regional Democratic Coalitions

Democratic India and ASEAN democracies must condition bilateral cooperation on restoration of democracy and press freedom in Bangladesh. Special envoys from India, Japan, and Indonesia may facilitate regional consensus.

6.4.3 Sanctions and Diplomatic Isolation

-  Targeted sanctions (Magnitsky-type) against top interim officials and Bangladesh Army involved in mass violence and election engineering.

- Suspension of military aid and surveillance technology transfers from countries like China and Turkey.

6.5 Strategic Roadmap for Democratic Transition

Phase Goal Key Actions

Phase 1: Stabilization: Stop repression, initiate truth-seeking Repeal DSA; Free political prisoners; UN-led fact-finding

Phase 2: Transition:  Build transitional structures Interim national council; Judicial oversight; Reconstitute EC

Phase 3: Restoration: Hold elections, restore institutions Free and fair elections; Establish democratic parliament

Phase 4: Deepening Democracy: Institutional reform SSR, judicial independence, media reform, decentralization

Phase: 5: According to the Constitution of the Peoples Republic Bangladesh, continuation of legal government led by Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina must form parliament then dissolve and suggestion receive from President of Bangladesh.

Finishing Touches: Bangladesh stands at a historic inflection point. The trajectory that follows will determine whether the country restores its democratic roots or descends into a prolonged autocratic abyss. The events after 5 August 2024, culminating in the Gopalganj massacre of 16 July 2025, have shaken the nation’s moral and legal foundations. The burden now rests upon domestic stakeholders and the international community to enact urgent, structured, and inclusive renovates. Only a comprehensive and courageous policy transformation can reclaim Bangladesh’s constitutional soul.

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